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THE POVERTY OF  
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF POVERTY:  
POLICY PAYOFF OR FALSE PROMISE? 
Amy L. Wax* 
ABSTRACT: A recent body of work in neuroscience examines the brains of people suf-
fering from social and economic disadvantage. This article assesses claims that this re-
search can help generate more effective strategies for addressing these social conditions 
and their effects. It concludes that the so-called neuroscience of deprivation has no 
unique practical payoff, and that scientists, journalists, and policy-makers should stop 
claiming otherwise. Because this research does not, and generally cannot, distinguish 
between innate versus environmental causes of brain characteristics, it cannot predict 
whether neurological and behavioral deficits can be addressed by reducing social depri-
vation. Also, knowledge of brain mechanisms yields no special insights, over and above 
behavioral science and social observation, into how to alleviate harms attributed to dep-
rivation. That project depends on changing real-world circumstances and behaviors, 
which is limited by ethical, practical, and political constraints. 
CITATION: Amy L. Wax, The Poverty of the Neuroscience of Poverty: Policy Payoff 
or False Promise?, 57 Jurimetrics J. 239–287 (2017). 
 The recent explosion of research linking human conduct to the operation of 
the brain has attracted attention from the popular media and a spectrum of 
scholars seeking to better understand a range of human behaviors.1 The findings 
of neuroscience have been adduced to explain addiction,2 criminal offending,3 
teenage risk-taking,4 compulsive gambling and shopping,5 academic under-
achievement,6 deception,7 and the prevention of social violence.8 One expanding 
                                                                                                                               
 *Robert Mundheim Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
 1. In their recent book, Sally Satel and Scott O. Lilienfeld note that “[t]he media—and even 
some neuroscientists, it seems—love to invoke the neural foundations of human behavior to explain 
everything . . . .” SALLY SATEL & SCOTT O. LILIENFELD, BRAINWASHED: THE SEDUCTIVE APPEAL 
OF MINDLESS NEUROSCIENCE, at ix (2015).  
 2. Id. at 51. 
 3. See, e.g., A PRIMER OF CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE at xv–xvi (Stephen Morse & 
Adina Roskies eds., 2013); see also Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts 
Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1128 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCI. 145 (2008); Nita Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An 
Empirical Analysis, 2 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 485, 487 (2015). 
 4. FRANCES JENSEN & AMY ELLIS NUTT, THE TEENAGE BRAIN 105–06 (2015); Laurence 
Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, ISSUES SCI. 
& TECH., Spring 2012, at 67. 
 5. See, e.g., SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 1, at 43–47. See generally COMM. ON 
INTEGRATING THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & 
INST. OF MED., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD 
DEVELOPMENT (Jack P. Shonkoff & Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000) [hereinafter FROM NEURONS 
TO NEIGHBORHOODS]. 
 6. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE (1998). 
 7. See Giorgio Ganis & Julian Paul Keenan, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Deception, 4 SOC.  
NEUROSCIENCE 465, 466 (2009). 
 8. See Lectures and Panels: Battling Blood in the Streets: How Can Neuroscience Promote 
Public Health and Support Public Policy to Prevent Community Violence?, PETRIE-FLOM CTR. 
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area of inquiry is the neuroscience related to the effects of social disadvantage.9 
Social and cognitive scientists have long documented a range of behavioral and 
cognitive deficits that are found more commonly in people from deprived cir-
cumstances.10 In an effort to better understand and address these deficits, a 
growing number of brain scientists and behaviorists have turned their attention 
to studying “brains on poverty”—that is, the structural and functional character-
istics of the brain that are linked to various aspects of low socioeconomic status 
(SES).11 Scientists have been especially concerned with deprivation and poverty 
experienced during childhood, with a corresponding focus on the consequences 
of low SES for the developing brain and associated childhood and adult behav-
iors.12  
 The literature on the neuroscience of disadvantage (or “deprivation-
neuroscience,” as I call it here) and the claims made on its behalf are the topic 
of this article. Researchers, as well as policy-oriented consumers of this litera-
ture, frequently suggest (and occasionally assert) that the discoveries of brain 
science can help generate more effective strategies for addressing poverty and 
deprivation and thus for reducing or eliminating its harmful effects. This article 
will assess these claims by evaluating the practical payoff for law and policy of 
knowledge generated by research in the field. It will consider whether, using the 
techniques and methods now available and commonly deployed by researchers 
studying the brains of disadvantaged individuals, neuroscience research can 
contribute to our ability, over and above what we know or can discover from 
behavioral science and social observation, to devise and craft interventions to 
reduce poverty and its adverse consequences. Specifically, it will address 
whether brain science has made a unique, indispensable contribution to finding 
methods for preventing the negative behavioral and cognitive effects of social 
and economic disadvantage or for curing them once they occur. 
                                                                                                                               
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/events/details/battling-blood-in-the-streets. Pan-
elists included Michelle Bosquet Enlow, Shannon Cosgrove, Fatimah Loren Muhammad, and 
Charles Homer. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Daniel A. Hackman et al., Socioeconomic Status and the Brain: Mechanistic 
Insights from Human and Animal Research, 11 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 651, 651 (2010).  
 10. See, e.g., Hackman et al., supra note 9; Robert M. Sapolsky, Stress and Cognition, in THE 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 1031 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 2004); Stephanie H.M. van Goozen 
et al., The Role of Neurobiological Deficits in Childhood Antisocial Behavior, 17 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 224 (2008); see also Vincent J. Felitti, Adverse Childhood Experiences 
and Adult Health, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 131 (2009); Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of 
Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: 
The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study , 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245 (1998); W. 
Thomas Boyce, A Biology of Misfortune, 29 FOCUS (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Madison, Wisc.), 
Spring/Summer 2012, at 1; Paul Tough, How Kids Learn Resilience, ATLANTIC (June 2016), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/how-kids-really-succeed/480744/. 
 11. Hackman et al., supra note 9. 
 12. See FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5; KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 
6; Martha J. Farah et al., Poverty, Privilege, and Brain Development: Empirical Findings and 
Ethical Implications, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 
277 (Judy Illes ed., 2006); Daniel A. Hackman & Martha J. Farah, Socioeconomic Status and the 
Developing Brain, 13 TRENDS NEUROCOGNITIVE SCI. 65 (2009); Hackman et al., supra note 9; 
Boyce, supra note 10. 
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 In addressing these questions, the article first reviews the literature that 
seeks to connect SES to structural and functional aspects of the brain and the 
behaviors linked to them. It then considers potential and actual claims regarding 
implications of the findings for devising effective policies and interventional 
strategies. As part of its assessment, the article will examine a controversy sur-
rounding the implications of a recent and widely publicized report linking brain 
morphology, cognitive function, and childhood disadvantage. It will then eval-
uate a lengthy law review article contending that neuroscientific findings on 
poverty’s effects on the developing brain dictate a revision of a federal law, the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which extends special protections 
and benefits to children with learning disabilities.  
 Drawing on these discussions, the article argues that neuroscientific re-
search currently yields no useful information for shaping policy and designing 
effective interventions to address poverty and inequality and its associated 
consequences. Nor will it likely alleviate those problems in the foreseeable 
future. First, neuroscientific studies that examine the brain characteristics asso-
ciated with deprivation do not, and generally cannot, establish causation. They 
do not distinguish between innate versus environmental influences on observed 
brain structure and function nor illuminate the range or extent of genetic-
environmental (G x E) interactions. This limitation has important implications 
for policy. If behavioral deficits associated with poverty are not solely, or even 
mainly, the result of environmental deprivation (as opposed to innate, genet-
ically programmed propensities that tend to correlate with disadvantaged cir-
cumstances, but are not produced by them), then those deficits are less likely to 
be subject to effective manipulation, at least through the type of preventative 
interventions that are a major focus of the developmental community to date.13 
Although prospective, randomized trials offer more potential for learning 
whether poverty’s effects on brains (or, for that matter, on corresponding be-
haviors) can be effectively alleviated—or whether heritable traits can be miti-
gated as well—the ambit for such studies is extremely narrow. In general, 
because the neuroscience to date cannot, and is not designed to, sort out causal 
mechanisms, studies in this field offer little help in predicting whether any par-
ticular proposal, intervention, program, or policy designed to address poverty 
will work to prevent or cure the adverse behavioral or brain effects associated 
with that condition.  
 Second, and apart from any difficulties with causation, neuroscience offers 
few if any insights over and above knowledge generated from other fields, in-
cluding most notably cognitive and behavioral psychology, into how society 
should address poverty, reverse its detrimental effects, or both. The sole insight 
                                                                                                                               
 13. In contrast, there is not a priori reason to predict that interventions geared to reversing 
behavioral or brain deficits are more likely to succeed depending on whether genes or environmental 
factors play a dominant causal role. Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 651, 657. However, neurosci-
ence has yet yielded no methods for reversing brain changes or behavioral defects associated with 
deprivation. Thus such cures have received little attention in the literature drawing on neuroscience. 
See id. 
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relevant to the explanatory and pragmatic power of brain science is that behav-
iors depend on brain states. There can be no observed change in behavior with-
out a corresponding change in the brain. But that understanding, which is 
nonspecific and contingent on no particular research findings, proceeds from a 
mechanistic, materialistic view of the human organism which has long been 
widely accepted in the biological and human sciences. This basic insight of bi-
ology neither establishes nor predicts the effectiveness of any policy designed 
to address social adversity and its supposed effects. The article concludes that, 
for both theoretical and practical reasons, no legal or policy choices depend on 
specific observations about the developing brain’s activities, shape, size, or con-
nections or on how deprivation alters these. Additionally, such observations 
cannot predict, determine, identify, or establish what works to prevent or reverse 
documented brain deficits and corresponding behavioral shortcomings.14 The 
effectiveness of any interventions must ultimately be demonstrated on a case by 
case basis through the accumulation of behavioral and social science evidence. 
And predictions about any policy’s effectiveness are only as good as the behav-
ioral evidence on which they rely. Because neuroscience data on poverty’s ef-
fects must always be correlated with behavioral observations, neuroscience can 
do no better than the behavioral evidence itself. It thus adds nothing to policy 
design, over and above what behavioral science can yield. 
I. RESEARCH ON  
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF DEPRIVATION 
 Numerous studies attempt to examine the link between various social out-
comes and low SES, variably defined to include poverty, lack of education, low 
social capital, and other measures.15 The biological and physiological correlates 
of these outcomes are the subject of research in several disciplines.16 Children 
from low SES families have been documented to experience broad conse-
quences for health and well-being, including shorter life spans and greater sus-
ceptibility to later illness and physical afflictions.17 Poverty has been tied to 
higher levels of stress, exaggerated reactivity, mental disorders and emotional 
disturbance, impulsive and aggressive behaviors, and vulnerability to addic-
tion.18 These effects are believed to be mediated, at least in part, through the 
                                                                                                                               
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See, e.g., Hackman et al., supra note 9 (“SES is a complex construct that is based on 
household income, material resources, education and occupation, as well as related neighborhood 
and family characteristics, such as exposure to violence and toxins, parental care and provision of a 
cognitively stimulating environment.”).  
 16. See, e.g., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 385 (“State-of-the-art 
knowledge about early childhood development is multidimensional and cross-disciplinary. It ex-
tends from painstaking efforts to understand the evolving circuitry and biochemistry of the immature 
brain to large-scale investigations of how family characteristics, neighborhood influences, and cul-
tural values affect the well-being of children as they grow up.”); Martha J. Farah et al., Childhood 
Poverty: Specific Associations with Neurocognitive Development, 1110 BRAIN RES. 166 (2006) 
(describing research focused on a neuroanatomical approach).  
 17. Felitti et al., supra note 10; Boyce, supra note 10. 
 18. See, e.g., Emalee G. Flaherty et al., Adverse Child Exposures and Reported Child Health 
at Age 12, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 150 (2009); Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 651–52; Boyce, supra 
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activation of hormonal and stress-reactive pathways, which operate through, and 
alter, brain circuitry, structure, and function.19  
 A large and growing body of research has focused specifically on the be-
havioral and cognitive deficits found in children growing up in deprived circum-
stances.20 Specifically, it is well documented that childhood SES is “correlated 
with intelligence and academic achievement from early childhood and through 
adolescence.”21 On average, children from lower SES backgrounds have been 
observed to fall short on a range of cognitive tasks (including language skills, 
memory, visualization, and reasoning ability).22 They also lag in noncognitive 
behavioral traits (such as executive function, perseverance, self-control, dis-
count rate and ability to delay gratification) that predict academic and life suc-
cess.23 Consistent with this research, children from disadvantaged backgrounds 
are at enhanced risk to suffer from academic difficulties in school, commit dis-
ciplinary infractions, and display self-destructive and antisocial behavior.24  
 The neuroscience of deprivation aims to build on these types of behavioral 
observations to generate a brain-centered body of knowledge that is focused on 
defined neuroanatomical and neurofunctional systems. The goal is to detail how 
poverty and low SES might alter particular brain structures, activities, and con-
nections, and to show how specific adverse experiences tend to bring about 
those changes. Like other fields seeking to elucidate the neural basis for be-
havior, deprivation neuroscience requires connecting human conduct, traits, ca-
pacities, and decision-making to brain states, structures, and activities.  
 Pursuing this project has been made possible by rapid developments in 
methods for visualizing the brain. Brain scanning techniques that create highly 
                                                                                                                               
note 10; see also Felitti, supra note 10; Felitti et al., supra note 10; Sapolsky, supra note 10; Van 
Goozen et al., supra note 10; Tough, supra note 10. 
 19. See, e.g., Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 653–55; Sonia J. Lupien et al., Effects of Stress 
Throughout the Lifespan on the Brain, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 434 (2009); Paula S. 
Nurius et al., Life Course Pathways of Adverse Childhood Experiences Toward Adult Psychological 
Well-Being: A Stress Process Analysis, 45 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 143 (2015). 
 20. See, e.g., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 5; KELMAN & LESTER, 
supra note 6, at 71–82; Farah et al., supra note 12; Daniel A. Hackman & Martha J. Farah, 
Socioeconomic Status and the Developing Brain, 13 TRENDS NEUROCOGNITIVE SCI. 65 (2009); 
Hackman et al., supra note 9; Boyce, supra note 10; see also Tough, supra note 10 (“More recently, 
researchers using variations on [the ACE] scale have found that an elevated ace score also has a 
negative effect on the development of a child’s executive functions and on her ability to learn effec-
tively in school.”). 
 21. Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 651.  
 22. See FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 287; Daniel A. Hackman et al., 
Socioeconomic Status and Executive Function: Developmental Trajectories and Mediation , 18 
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 686, 696–98 (2015). See generally Gwendolyn M. Lawson et al., 
Socioeconomic Status and the Development of Executive Function: Behavioral and Neuroscience 
Approaches, in EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN PRESCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN: INTEGRATING MEASUREMENT, 
NEURODEVELOPMENT, AND TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 259 (James A. Griffin et al. eds., 2016).  
 23. Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 696. 
 24. See, e.g., Christine Christle et al., School Characteristics Related to High School Dropout 
Rates, 28 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 325, 333 (2007); John M. Wallace, Jr. et al., Racial, Ethnic, 
and Gender Differences in School Discipline Among U.S. High School Students: 1991–2005, 59 
NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 57–59 (2008); John Paul Wright et al., Prior Problem Behavior Accounts 
for the Racial Gap in School Suspensions, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 257, 257 (2014).  
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detailed pictures of brain morphology and ongoing brain activity have enabled 
researchers to link up brain structure and function with various behavioral states 
and syndromes and to picture the brain while it performs a range of activities 
linked to cognitive abilities.25 This and other techniques for mapping brain struc-
tures, tracing connections, and watching the brain in action have been deployed 
by neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists interested in the effects of early 
deprivation.26  
 Martha Farah and her colleagues have been particularly influential in gal-
vanizing and shaping research in the field by developing a theoretical map, 
based on preexisting neurofunctional and neuroanatomical studies, which pre-
dicts the areas of the brain most likely to be affected by childhood adversity.27 
These researchers rely on the observation that “the SES disparity in cognitive 
development is not uniform across different neurocognitive systems but rather 
is more pronounced for some neurocognitive systems than for others.”28 Their 
strategy is to hone in on particular brain structures known to be associated with 
the functional deficits observed in children subject to early adversity.29 For ex-
ample, behavioral studies show that, compared to the general population, lower 
income children and adults tend to have poorer working memory,30 less inhibi-
tory control, and worse executive attention and function.31 Other areas of docu-
mented deficiency are impairments in spatial and visual cognition, inferior 
language skills as reflected in vocabulary size, syntactic ability, and phonolog-
ical awareness (that is, ability to distinguish words, variations in word usage, 
and meaning)32 and difficulties with cognitive control.33 Based on an analysis 
of these deficits, neuroanatomical knowledge, and their own research, Farah and 
colleagues have identified seven localized regional brain circuits, or “neurocog-
nitive systems” likely to be affected by childhood deprivation and ripe for more 
intensive investigation.34  
Much of the work of Farah and her group, and the research linking brain 
structure and function to low SES generally, relies heavily on neuroscientific 
                                                                                                                               
 25. For a description of fMRI, see A PRIMER OF CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra 
note 3, at 1, 37–38.  
 26. See id. at 75–76, 78. 
 27. Farah et al., supra note 16, at 166–67.  
 28. Id. at 168.  
 29. Id. at 167.  
 30. See generally Gary W. Evans & Michelle A. Schamberg, Childhood Poverty, Chronic 
Stress, and Adult Working Memory, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6545 (2009). 
 31. Hackman & Farah, supra note 20, at 65; see Gary W. Evans, The Environment of 
Childhood Poverty, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 77 (2004); Gary W. Evans & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Self-
Regulation and the Income-Achievement Gap, 23 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 504 (2008). 
 32. Farah et al., supra note 12, at 279–80; see also Kimberly G. Noble et al., Socioeconomic 
Background Modulates Cognition–Achievement Relationships in Reading, 21 COGNITIVE DEV. 349 
(2006). 
 33. Kimberly G. Noble et al., Socioeconomic Gradients Predict Individual Differences in 
Neurocognitive Abilities, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 464, 471 (2007). 
 34. These areas include, inter alia, the prefrontal/executive systems, the lateral cortex/working 
memory, the anterior cingulate cortex/cognitive control system, and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex/reward processing system. See Farah et al., supra note 16, at 167; see also Hackman & Farah, 
supra note 20, 279–81; Noble et al., supra note 33, at 465. 
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techniques of recent vintage. Most important is magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI), which can be used to create individual images of brain structures as well 
as dynamic pictures of localized neural activity.35 A static, or structural, MRI 
image is generated when a brain is placed in a magnetic field and the brain mol-
ecules are stimulated by radiofrequency pulses.36 Areas that differ in density and 
composition create disparate signals, which are captured by the machine to 
create a contrasting visual image of the brain.37 Functional MRI (fMRI) depends 
on measuring three-dimensional hemodynamic (blood flow) patterns associated 
with variations in brain activity.38 The blood flow patterns are then translated 
into visual images. For both structural and functional MRI, the techniques of 
visualization and the presentation of the data vary, depending on research design 
and available evidence.39 Some studies rely on single images of individual sub-
jects whereas others aggregate multiple images from one or more subjects to 
create a composite picture of activity levels associated with particular conditions 
or tasks.40  
 Yet another technique, involving a smaller number of studies, makes use of 
event-related brain potentials (ERPs), which are stylized electrical signals meas-
ured at the brain surface.41 By picking up on patterned processes taking place 
throughout the brain, this technique can detect and reflect changes in localized 
activity. Ordinarily, the electrical recording is timed to coordinate with a stim-
ulus (usually auditory or visual, such as a word, picture, or sound flashed to the 
subject) or with the performance of a functional task (such as listening to a 
story). The ERPs reported by researchers using this technique are generally av-
eraged over hundreds or thousands of recordings, gleaned from one or more 
subjects or trials.42 
 Overall, approximately two dozen studies published since 2001 fall into the 
category of deprivation neuroscience. This work uses either neuroimaging or 
ERP techniques to examine the structure or function of the brains of individuals 
who have experienced some documented form of developmental deprivation, or 
who suffer impairments or functional abnormalities that are known to be corre-
lated with lower SES. The great majority of this research relies on some variant 
of MRI or fMRI methodology. This imaging research, in turn, can be divided 
into two broad categories. The first (termed here “retrospective”) is designed to 
mine and analyze data from numerous scans performed and collected in the 
course of large demographic studies, conducted within the past 15 years or so, 
that are not specifically directed at examining the effects of low SES. The 
second type of research (“prospective”) is specifically designed to establish the 
                                                                                                                               
 35. A PRIMER OF CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 3, at 40. 
36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 40–43 (describing MRI and fMRI techniques in detail).  
38. Id. at 41. 
39. Id. at 40–42. 
40. Id.  
 41. See Shravani Sur & V.K. Sinha, Event-Related Potential: An Overview, 18 INDUS. 
PSYCHIATRY J. 70, 70 (2009). 
 42. See Sandra K. Loo & Scott Makeig, Clinical Utility of EEG in Attention-Deficit/ 
Hyperactivity Disorder: A Research Update, 9 NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 569, 570 (2012).  
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neurofunctional patterns associated with particular behaviors or performance 
deficits found in lower SES individuals.43 
 The analyses from the retrospective studies, which number in the single 
digits in the literature, focus on measurement and morphology, including the 
size, thickness, and shape of brain centers linked to known cognitive or behav-
ioral functions. An example of research providing data for such analyses is a 
large multisite, multiyear National Institutes of Health MRI imaging study of 
normal brain development.44 Because these data sets contain a large number of 
brain images of study subjects as well as information on background, history, 
and SES, and, in some cases, cognitive attributes, behavior, or performance on 
specific tasks, the studies are useful for investigating the brain correlates of early 
disadvantage.45 The goal is to explore correlations between brain structure and 
functional impairments by investigating whether particular brain centers found 
in lower SES individuals, or those who have suffered documented forms of early 
deprivation, differ measurably from those of less deprived subjects, and whether 
those brain changes correspond to functional defects more commonly found in 
lower SES individuals.  
One of the first reports of this type looked at brain scans performed on a 
group of severely deprived Rumanian orphans. These reports used an earlier 
imaging technique, predating fMRI technology, called Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET). PET provides a measure of oxygen consumption by brain 
tissue that reflects relative brain function and integrity.46 The PET scans of the 
study subjects showed diminished volume and activity in frontal areas (which 
are associated with self-control and executive function), as well as in the 
amygdala and hippocampus (which are seats of emotion and memory).47  
A second retrospective study reviewed scans from 445 American subjects 
of various ages. It claimed to document an average decrease in the volume of 
the hippocampus of children who suffered from deficient maternal care (which 
tends to be associated with lower SES). Documentation was established by self-
report and objective evidence collected in the study.48 A third report, by Nicole 
Hair and her colleagues, was based on an analysis of fMRI scans performed on 
389 students of various ages.49 The authors claimed to establish a three-way 
statistical correlation between a paucity of gray matter (brain tissue) in various 
                                                                                                                               
 43. See Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 654.  
 44. See, e.g., Brain Dev. Coop. Grp., The NIH MRI Study of Normal Brain Development, 30 
NEUROIMAGE 184 (2006) (describing the study); see also PEDIATRIC MRI DATA REPOSITORY 
WEBSITE, https://pediatricmri.nih.gov/nihpd/info/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (the project 
website). 
 45. See Hackman et al., supra note 9, at 651–53. 
 46. See generally Harry T. Chugani et al., Local Brain Functional Activity Following Early 
Deprivation: A Study of Post-Institutionalized Romanian Orphans, 14 NEUROIMAGE 1290 (2001). 
 47. Id. at 1299.  
 48. See generally Claudia Buss et al., Maternal Care Modulates the Relationship Between 
Prenatal Risk and Hippocampal Volume in Women but Not in Men, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2592 
(2007).  
 49. Nicole L. Hair et al., Association of Child Poverty, Brain Development, and Academic 
Achievement, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 822, 822 (2015).  
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parts of the brain, being raised by lower status parents (as defined and docu-
mented in the research data), and measured deficits in academic achievement.50 
Yet another study, using 203 scans from 77 infants conducted serially over sev-
eral months, concluded that “infants from low income families had lower vol-
umes of gray matter” and also that less gray matter was associated with a greater 
risk of disruptive behaviors later in childhood.51 Also, in a group of 283 scans 
conducted on children of various ages, Gwendolyn Lawson and her colleagues, 
working with Martha Farah, observed a statistical relationship between one as-
pect of SES (parental education) but not others (such as household income), and 
prefrontal cortical thickness.52 Finally, just last year, as widely reported in the 
press, Kimberly Noble and colleagues, using a large database of more than 1000 
scans collected through a government-sponsored pediatric imaging project, re-
ported that low childhood SES, and especially lower levels of income and pa-
rental education, are associated with a smaller brain surface area in children 
between 3 and 20 years old, with severely deprived children showing the most 
pronounced effects.53 The observed reductions in surface area were widely dis-
persed, affecting centers for language, spatial perception, memory, and execu-
tive function. The paper also reported subjects’ performance on various tests of 
cognitive function known to be associated with particular brain areas, and at-
tempted to match these with localized brain size data.54 A significant three-way 
correspondence (among measures of disadvantage, smaller brain surface area, 
and behavioral shortcomings) was found for some functions (self-control and 
working memory) but not others (verbal skills).55 
 Instead of mining existing datasets, the prospective studies in the field are 
specifically geared to collecting new data designed to link brain structure and 
function, childhood experiences, and existing behavioral characteristics. These 
studies generally tend to be smaller, and thus have fewer data points, than ret-
rospective research based on existing data repositories. The work also tends to 
be directed at examining highly specific behavioral functions known to be com-
promised in disadvantaged children, with targeting of localized brain areas as-
sociated with those deficits. The resulting body of work is a congeries of 
discrete, and often disjointed, observations that focus on distinct brain centers 
and use a variety of different measures of social disadvantage.  
For example, Mark Gianaros and colleagues, generating functional fMRI 
images on 100 adult experimental subjects from a range of backgrounds, claim 
                                                                                                                               
 50. Id.  
 51. Jamie L. Hanson et al., Family Poverty Affects the Rate of Human Infant Brain Growth, 
PLOS ONE, Dec. 2013, at 1.  
 52. See generally Gwendolyn M. Lawson et al., Associations Between Children’s 
Socioeconomic Status and Prefrontal Cortical Thickness, 16 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 641 (2013). 
 53. Kimberly G. Noble et al., Family Income, Parental Education and Brain Structure in 
Children and Adolescents, 18 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 773, 777 (2015).  
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. More recent data from this study, including a more extensive analysis of age-related 
changes in cortical thickness and brain surface area associated with low SES, has been posted online 
by Noble and her colleagues. See Luciane R. Piccolo et al., Age-Related Differences in Cortical 
Thickness Vary by Socioeconomic Status, PLOS ONE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://journals.plos.org/ 
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0162511. 
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to have established a correlation between perceived parental social standing and 
“greater amygdala reactivity to threatening facial expression.”56 Another re-
search group, recruiting 49 subjects in their 20s, found that individuals with 
lower family income at age 9 had selectively reduced activity in the prefrontal 
cortex (an area associated with self-control and executive function) as measured 
using fMRI techniques.57 The poorer subjects were also measurably less able 
than higher SES subjects to suppress amygdala activation during emotional 
stimulation.58 Based on fMRI scans performed on 145 children over a six year 
period, Luby and colleagues found lower volumes in multiple brain centers in 
lower SES children, especially those with a history of inadequate maternal care. 
These observations were also correlated with selective behavioral impairments, 
such as poor self-control.59   
 Likewise, another scanning study of 58 adolescents reported greater cortical 
bulk in all lobes of the brain for higher income students in the sample, with 
thicker morphology predicting better performance on tests of general intellec-
tual ability.60 Yet another fMRI scanning study, which looked at 150 first grade 
students, reported that depressed activity in specialized areas for face recogni-
tion and language (the left fusiform and perisylvian areas) during active reading 
was linked to weaker phonological skills, which were in turn more prevalent in 
the lower SES subjects.61 A different prospective study using 49 black middle 
school children (approximately 14 years old) revealed an association between 
less early childhood nurturance (ages 4–8) established by questionnaire and a 
smaller size hippocampus (which is a brain structure involved in memory and 
emotion) on fMRI.62 No association was found between scan-documented vol-
umes and other measured aspects of childhood environment.63 The authors con-
cluded that “hippocampal volume is specifically associated with early parental 
nurturance.”64 In another dynamic fMRI study of 14 prekindergarten children 
(age 5) looking at the correlation between brain, behavior, and the environment, 
researchers observed a strong SES-related gradient in the degree of lateral spe-
cialization in the left inferior frontal gyrus, an area known to be involved in 
                                                                                                                               
 56. Peter Gianaros et al., Potential Neural Embedding of Parental Social Standing, 3 SOC.  
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 91, 91 (2008); see also Peter Gianaros et al., Perigenual 
Anterior Cingulate Morphology Covaries with Perceived Social Standing, 2 SOC. COGNITIVE 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 161, 168–169 (2007).  
 57. Pilyoung Kim et al., Effects of Childhood Poverty and Chronic Stress on Emotion 
Regulatory Brain Function in Adulthood, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18442, 18442 (2013).  
 58. Id. 
 59. See Joan Luby et al., The Effects of Poverty on Childhood Brain Development: The 
Mediating Effect of Caregiving and Stressful Life Events, 167 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1135, 1140–41 
(2013). 
 60. Allyson P. Mackey et al., Neuroanatomical Correlates of the Income-Achievement Gap, 
26 PSYCHOL. SCI. 925, 925 (2015). 
 61. See Noble et al., supra note 32; see also Kimberly G. Noble et al., Brain-Behavior 
Relationships in Reading Acquisition Are Modulated by Socioeconomic Factors, 9 DEVELOPMENTAL 
SCI. 642 (2006).  
 62. See Hengyi Rao et al., Early Parental Care Is Important for Hippocampal Maturation: 
Evidence from Brain Morphology in Humans, 49 NEUROIMAGE 1144, 1144 (2010). 
 63. Id. at 1147.  
 64. Id. at 1144.  
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reading tasks, with reduced lateralization in lower SES students.65 However, the 
association between measured reading-related skills (as assessed through a 
rhyming task), degree of lateralization, and SES in the sample was weak or non-
existent.66 Finally, a research group used MRI scans to investigate the associa-
tion between SES and brain anatomy in 23 healthy, 10-year-old children with a 
wide range of parental SES.67 Their data revealed that language skills differed 
measurably by SES in the study sample. The authors also reported widespread 
SES-related differences in volume and surface area over a range of brain struc-
tures.68  
 Another cluster of studies designed to examine the effects of social disad-
vantage on the brain makes use of the brain-activity recording, or ERP, tech-
nique described above. This approach is largely directed at documenting brain 
activity patterns associated with verbal abilities, especially oral language com-
prehension. For instance, D’Angiulli and colleagues examined ERP patterns in 
28 children who were instructed to attend to auditory stimuli.69 The data indi-
cated that localized ERP signals recorded in response to auditory stimuli con-
sisting of stories and nonsense sounds played simultaneously in different ears 
were weaker for low SES than for high SES children. The authors interpreted 
these results as suggesting that disadvantaged children are on average less able 
to tune out ambient distractions and remain attentive to meaningful verbal ma-
terial. They speculated that this might help account for their relative deficiencies 
in reading skills and language comprehension.  
Stevens and colleagues used a similar design of two-channel auditory 
stimuli to examine the ERP response pattern in 32 children aged 3 to 8.70 In a 
refinement of D’Angiulli’s report, their data suggests that a weaker ability to 
filter out irrelevant auditory information was correlated with lower levels of ma-
                                                                                                                               
 65. Rajeev D.S. Raizada et al., Socioeconomic Status Predicts Hemispheric Specialisation of 
the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus in Young Children, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1392, 1392 (2008).  
 66. Id. at 1396. This pattern led the authors to speculate whether the scans showed “a relation-
ship between SES and language processing that purely behavioural tests are unable to reveal,” with 
the connection between SES and the observed laterality operating via “non-linguistic mechanisms.” 
Id. The authors concluded, somewhat mysteriously, that the weaker language skills of low SES 
children “are related to reduced underlying neuronal specialization,” which is not necessarily re-
vealed “by behavioural tests alone.” Id. at 1392. 
 67. Katarzyna Jednoróg et al., The Influence of Socioeconomic Status on Children’s Brain 
Structure, PLOS ONE, Aug. 2012, at 1, 9. 
 68. Id. The authors reported an association between lower SES and “smaller volumes of gray 
matter in bilateral hippocampi, middle temporal gyri, left fusiform and right inferior occipito-
temporal gyri” as well as “gyrification effects in anterior frontal regions,” which was “supportive of 
a potential developmental lag in lower SES children.” Id. at 1. They saw “no significant association 
between SES and white matter architecture.” Id. 
 69. See Amedeo D’Angiulli et al., Children’s Event-Related Potentials of Auditory Selective 
Attention Vary with Their Socioeconomic Status, 22 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 293, 299 (2008); Amedeo 
D’Angiulli et al., Towards a Cognitive Science of Social Inequality: Children’s Attention-Related 
ERPs and Salivary Cortisol Vary with Their Socioeconomic Status, 30 PROC. 30TH ANN. CONF. 
COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 211, 215 (2008);  
 70. Courtney Stevens et al., Differences in the Neural Mechanisms of Selective Attention in 
Children from Different Socioeconomic Backgrounds: An Event-Related Brain Potential Study, 12 
DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 634, 634 (2009).  
Wax 
 
 
250 57 JURIMETRICS 
ternal education, which was one aspect of disadvantage among those meas-
ured.71 In a separate study on 25 mostly low-income children, the same authors 
were able to elicit a measurable change in the magnitude of lateral ERPs by 
training low income children to focus their attention.72 The effectiveness of the 
training, as evinced by a more normal pattern of ERP signals, correlated with 
improved language recognition and comprehension. That study made no attempt 
to measure or control for SES effects.73 The authors also conceded that their 
research, which lacked long-term follow up, was not designed to gauge 
“whether either the attention or receptive language gains persisted after the in-
tervention ended.”74 
II. METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
 As the above summary indicates, neuroscientific work designed to investi-
gate the effects of early socioeconomic disadvantage on the brain has yielded 
about two dozen actual research papers, most published or posted online within 
the past 10–15 years. These publications contain either a retrospective analysis 
of evidence generated by others, or reports based on evidence gathered by the 
researchers themselves. This work consists mainly of imaging studies, supple-
mented by measures of event-related potentials, or ERPs. As noted, this litera-
ture builds on a large, ongoing body of work in behavioral and cognitive 
psychology, which documents and explores the psychological, emotional, and 
cognitive patterns associated with various forms of social deprivation, and 
draws on a broader background of research exploring the physiological, biolog-
ical, and health-related correlates of adversity.75 The research is summarized in, 
and supplemented by, a host of review articles and journalistic reports that, al-
though not containing original data, collate and discuss the findings in the neu-
roscientific literature and comment on their implications.76  
                                                                                                                               
 71. Id. at 640. 
 72. Courtney Stevens et al., Neural Mechanisms of Selective Auditory Attention Are Enhanced 
by Computerized Training: Electrophysiological Evidence from Language-Impaired and Typically 
Developing Children, 1205 BRAIN RES. 55, 64 (2008).  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. See generally Natalie H. Brito & Kimberly G. Noble, Socioeconomic Status and Structural 
Brain Development, FRONTIERS NEUROSCIENCE, Sept. 2014, at 1, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins. 
2014.00276. According to the April 2016 policy statement released by the American Academy of 
Pediatrics and the Academic Pediatric Association on the deleterious effects of childhood poverty,  
“[c]hild poverty . . . influences genomic function and brain development by exposure to toxic stress, 
a condition characterized by ‘excessive or prolonged activation of the physiologic stress response 
systems in the absence of the buffering protection afforded by stable, responsive relationships.’ Chil-
dren living in poverty are at increased risk of difficulties with self-regulation and executive function, 
such as inattention, impulsivity, defiance, and poor peer relationships.”  
Council on Cmty. Pediatrics, Poverty and Child Health in the United States, PEDIATRICS, Apr. 2016, 
at 1, 1–2. The statement and accompanying report also discuss a host of health-related ills associated 
with poverty, noting that “[p]overty has a profound effect on specific circumstances, such as birth 
weight, infant mortality, language development, chronic illness, environmental exposure, nutrition, 
and injury.” Id. at 1. 
 76. For further review, see, e.g., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5; Farah et 
al., supra note 16; Farah et al., supra note 12; Hackman & Farah, supra note 20; Hackman et al., 
supra note 9, at 651; see also Sara Burr Johnson et al., State of the Art Review: Poverty and the 
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 The studies, as well as the reviews, reveal the neuroscience of deprivation 
to be a nascent field. Although heralded with much fanfare, the work to date has 
not generated a large, unified body of evidence. The anatomical observations 
are often crude and broad-brush, the sample sizes for original research small, 
the observations haphazard, and the associations frequently variable, weak, and 
of marginal statistical significance. Overall, the impression is of a scientific en-
deavor that is just getting started and operating on a superficial level while strug-
gling to define its methods and focus. 
 That state of affairs will likely continue for the indefinite future. Although 
the pace of the neuroscientific study of deprivation is intensifying, no dramatic 
leap forward should be expected anytime soon. A number of methodological 
obstacles stand in the way. First, human neuroscience currently relies heavily 
on neuroimaging, and especially the recently refined technique of fMRI, to in-
vestigate both functional and morphological aspects of the brain. Although im-
aging techniques are work-intensive and require a high degree of subject 
cooperation, they are considered relatively harmless to targets of study. More 
intrusive alternatives—that is, methods that require directly modifying the 
brain—remain underdeveloped and are unlikely to emerge anytime soon. In-
vading and probing the human brain, or altering its function and structure 
through pharmacological, physical, or electrical manipulation, create the poten-
tial for considerable harm without any corresponding benefit to the subjects 
themselves. For this reason, research using invasive techniques is unlikely to 
attract volunteer subjects or to win the approval of those assigned to oversee 
participants’ well-being.  
 Research on the effects of poverty on the brain encounters additional limi-
tations from the nature of the inquiry itself. Because the brain is believed to be 
most vulnerable to deprivation during development, many studies involve chil-
dren. But generating fMRI scans on children is an arduous and ethically fraught 
endeavor.77 Parents are understandably reluctant to consent to their children’s 
participation, especially in longitudinal research requiring multiple scans over 
time. Studies must be approved by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), which 
are charged with insuring that the risks of harm are minimized and that benefits 
for subjects outweigh burdens. IRBs are especially protective of minors, who 
cannot themselves give informed consent. Additional difficulties arise from the 
contours of study design. Many projects are directed at establishing a three-way 
correspondence—among past or present deprivation, brain characteristics, and 
performance. For the purpose of visualizing brains and measuring behavior, 
                                                                                                                               
Developing Brain, PEDIATRICS, Apr. 2016, at 1; Council on Cmty. Pediatrics, supra note 75; 
Deepening Connections Between Neuroscience and Public Policy to Understand Poverty, FAST 
FOCUS, June 2016, at 1, 1–3, http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/fastfocus/pdfs/FF23-2016.pdf. 
For more popular presentations and summaries, see generally Jim Dwyer, How Poverty Keeps 
Hurting Young Minds, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2016, at A15; Daniel R. Taylor, A Doctor’s Call for 
Action on Childhood Poverty, PHILA. INQUIRER Apr. 24, 2016, at G01. 
 77. See Andrew Fenton et al., Ethical Challenges and Interpretive Difficulties with Non-
Clinical Applications of Pediatric fMRI, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2009). 
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children do not always make cooperative subjects.78 Getting children to remain 
immobile in a scanner, or to perform while being scanned, is fraught with diffi-
culties. When the experiment requires subjects to perform functional operations 
such as reading, listening, looking, or speaking, children may not act coopera-
tively, follow directions, or put forth a consistent effort. The measured results 
can therefore be unpredictable, erratic, and difficult to standardize.  
 Finally, an important variable in studies that seek to establish the effects of 
social deprivation is the past or present environment in which subjects live or 
are raised. The parameters or proxies for early disadvantage tend to be imprecise 
and ad hoc, and researchers use the terms poverty, disadvantage, deprivation, 
and low SES somewhat indiscriminately. As a result, there is no single standard-
ized metric that holds sway in neuroscience or cognate fields, and the dimen-
sions of deprivation actually measured in any given study are often selective and 
driven by available information. These can include household income, home 
environment, parental education, job status, perceived status, neighborhood 
characteristics, “life stress,” and aspects of parental behavior, including neglect, 
abuse, nurturance, emotional support, disciplinary style, enrichment efforts 
(such as reading to children, or number of toys) or quality or quantity of verbal 
interaction. The methods for assessing these parameters vary, and include retro-
spective and subjective reports that are often imperfect and incomplete. Finally, 
children do not necessarily face a consistent or uniform environment while 
growing up. Childhood deprivation can last for varying periods and conditions 
of upbringing can change, sometimes drastically, over time. For these reasons, 
and others, many datasets in deprivation neuroscience are quirky, noisy, un-
standardized, or incomplete, and are destined to remain so. These shortcomings 
reduce the reliability, reproducibility, and statistical significance of the results 
in the field.79 The broader point is that the observations of deprivation neurosci-
ence can be no better than the behavioral measures with which they are corre-
lated. If those measures are flawed, imprecise, or irregular, then the brain studies 
will be unreliable and variable as well. Such limitations are endemic to the field, 
and are not likely to be corrected anytime soon. 
III. GENES VS. ENVIRONMENT— 
EXTERNAL CAUSATION VS. SELECTION EFFECTS 
 One notable feature of the neuroscience studies described above is that they 
document correlations only, and are not equipped to establish causation. Specif-
ically, the research designs are not geared to sort out how much of the changes 
or deficits observed in the brains of less privileged subjects can be attributed to 
the environmental conditions to which those brains have been exposed, as op-
posed to innate or genetically programmed factors. In fact, as discussed more 
                                                                                                                               
 78. See generally Nora Raschle et al., Pediatric Neuroimaging in Early Childhood and 
Infancy: Challenges and Practical Guidelines, 1252 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 43 (2012). 
 79. See, e.g., Deepening Connections Between Neuroscience and Public Policy to Understand 
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fully below, the problem of establishing causation is not just endemic to neuro-
science. Rather, it bedevils much work in the developmental psychology of dep-
rivation, and in behavioral and psychological investigations of all types.  
 The inability of research on deprivation, including neuroscience, to disen-
tangle mechanisms of causation and trace observed results to genetic versus en-
vironmental influences is central to the question of whether, and how, the 
science can meaningfully inform public policy. To summarize the main point: 
the effectiveness of particular strategies, programs, or interventions designed to 
reduce, or prevent, the effects of childhood deprivation—which are the main 
focus of policy discussions that draw on deprivation neuroscience—will almost 
always depend critically on whether the social conditions these policies seek to 
alleviate are actually responsible for the adverse brain and behavioral effects 
attributed to them. If a deprived environment (as opposed to other factors) has 
a modest or negligible role in producing the deficits observed, then alleviating 
or removing the cause—by eliminating the deprivation or establishing a more 
normal or enriched environment—cannot be expected to alleviate those deficits.  
To be sure, one potential objection to this line of reasoning is that elimi-
nating early adversity need not be the only way to cure impairments, however 
caused, that are associated with deprived conditions. Traits or behaviors with a 
strong genetic basis can sometimes be externally alleviated or corrected. Oft-
repeated examples are the ability of eyeglasses—a purely “environmental” in-
tervention—to correct the myopia that results from an inherited eye condition; 
or the effects of a strict diet, which can relieve many of the symptoms of the 
genetic condition of phenylketonuria or PKU.80 However, as discussed and elab-
orated below, the literature on the practical payoff from deprivation neurosci-
ence is geared almost exclusively to preventative strategies. Attempts to reverse 
the purported effects of poverty on brains and behavior after they have occurred 
have so far yielded negligible results. We simply have no idea how to cure the 
impairments associated with disadvantage, and neither neuroscience nor behav-
ioral science has taught us how to do so. 
 The discussion in this Part so far assumes a simple conceptual divide be-
tween external, or environmental, causes of the brain changes associated with 
deprivation versus innate, or genetic factors. In fact, this dichotomy is not all-
or-none in practice: virtually all behavior is known to be influenced by both 
mechanisms, with experience modifying the expression (or phenotype) of 
genetic traits (or genotype) to a variable extent through so-called genetic-
environmental, or G x E interactions.81 The phenotypical modifications of gene 
                                                                                                                               
 80. See, e.g., Steven Pinker, Why Nature & Nurture Won’t Go Away, DAEDALUS, Fall 2004, 
at 5, 10 (noting that a strict diet can relieve the symptoms and damage from PKU, but only partially).  
 81. For lucid reviews of research on gene-environment interactions and the influence of innate 
endowment versus environmental influence on human behavior, personality, and cognitive ability, 
see STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE (2002); Stephen B. Manuck & Jeanne M. McCaffery, Gene-
Environment Interaction, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 41 (2014); Pinker, supra note 80; Afterward to 
STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). For a summary of 
the pervasive role of genetic factors in human behavior, see, e.g., Robert Plomin et al., Top 10 
Replicated Findings from Behavioral Genetics, 11 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2016). For specific 
examples, see, e.g., Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated 
Wax 
 
 
254 57 JURIMETRICS 
expression, which can range from transient to durable, affect human mor-
phology, physiology, and functioning, and are responsible for functional and 
structural specialization between and within different body organs, including 
distinct brain centers, both during and after development.82 In any instance, the 
interaction is always one of degree: to what extent and under what conditions 
can environmental factors alter the expression of genes, and what are the limits 
on expressive possibilities? Answering those questions requires establishing the 
so-called “norm of reaction,” defined as the complete range of phenotypic 
(physical or behavioral) manifestations observed across the full spectrum of am-
bient conditions that an organism can encounter.83  
 As applied to the study of social disadvantage, as with any other arena of 
human behavior, the interaction of genetic with environmental factors is daunt-
ingly complex, with the contribution of genetic endowment to phenotypic vari-
ation neither fixed nor necessarily linear. Rather, the interaction is contingent 
on the environment, or range of environments, the organism encounters. The 
contribution of ambient factors can run the gamut from “quite a bit” to “hardly 
at all,” depending on the trait at issue and the circumstances in which it is ob-
served. Some environments suppress the expression of genetic variation, 
whereas others enhance genes’ influence and cause genetic distinctions to dom-
inate. This does not mean that genes impose no limit on physical traits or be-
havior. Under some conditions, even if not all, genes can cause phenotypes to 
dramatically diverge.84  
A simple example of this point is the height of plants, which is under strong 
genetic control. Plants with different alleles (or genetic sequences) that influ-
ence height will exhibit similar growth in a dry environment.85 But genetically 
tall plants will tower over plants with “short” gene variants when provided with 
water and nutrients.86 In the same vein, some researchers have claimed that dep-
rivation enhances the environmental contribution to measured intelligence 
(thereby causing many poor children to fall short of their intellectual potential) 
                                                                                                                               
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851, 851–52 (2002); J. Kim-Cohen et al., MAOA, Maltreatment, and Gene-
Environment Interaction Predicting Children’s Mental Health: New Evidence and a Meta-Analysis, 
11 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 903, 910 (2006).  
 82. See generally Manuck & McCaffery, supra note 81.  
 83. Id. at 58. 
84. See Pinker, supra note 80, at 10. 
85. Id.  
 86. Id. Pinker observes that “different strains of corn may grow to different heights when 
equally irrigated, but a plant from the taller strain might end up shorter if it is deprived of water.” 
Id. He notes from this and other examples that although “some genetic effects may be nullified in 
certain environments, not all of them are.” Id. at 11. Specifically, he asserts that “studies that 
measure both genetic and environmental similarity (such as adoption designs, where correlations 
with adoptive and biological parents can be compared) show numerous main effects of personality, 
intelligence, and behavior across a range of environmental variation.” Id. Pinker also warns against 
inferring from exceptional extremes that “heredity imposes no constraints on behavior.” Id. at 10. 
Rather, “just because extreme environments can disrupt a trait does not mean that the ordinary range 
of environments will modulate that trait, nor does it mean that environment can explain the nature 
of the trait.” Id. at 11. 
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because it suppresses the expression of genes for high intelligence.87 In contrast, 
environmental enrichment increases the contribution of genetic endowment to 
individual differences in intellectual performance by enabling genes for high 
intelligence to be fully expressed (thus allowing the gifted to achieve their full 
“natural” potential).88 According to a recent study, a similar pattern appears to 
prevail with body weight.89 The analysis of demographic data suggests that ge-
netic propensities to obesity dominate individual outcomes in the current era, in 
which people have wide access to abundant, cheap, high calorie food. In past 
decades, in contrast, when food was less available and access more tightly con-
trolled by conventional restraints, body weight was more uniform (and most 
people thinner) because genetic differences were less often expressed.90 Once 
again, as with intelligence, so with obesity: “enrichment” facilitates the expres-
sion, hence the dominance, of genetic variations, which produce a pattern of 
greater individual differences in observed traits.  
 The factors that determine intelligence and obesity are hotly contested, with 
no clear consensus on how genes and environment combine to produce observed 
patterns. This is not the place for a sophisticated review of the array of concep-
tual and methodological puzzles presented by these phenomena. Rather, these 
examples are provided to show that the relationships of genes to environment, 
and genotype to phenotype, are complex and unpredictable. That complexity 
applies as well to the contribution of environmental and genetic factors to the 
brain and behavioral disparities associated with SES.  
 As already noted, scientists have identified behavioral traits that are more 
frequently observed in the lower SES population, including poor social skills 
and learning difficulties. It is possible to posit a causal story that attributes each 
impairment to an array of external forces—ranging from material conditions to 
interactions with parents to constraints imposed by the broader world. Most 
straightforwardly, lack of material resources can operate directly on the child 
and its brain by interfering with the satisfaction of basic needs, such as for food, 
adequate shelter, or medical care. Or poverty can operate indirectly by influ-
encing parental behavior. Stressed parents are less likely to create positive or 
rich home environments, engage in stimulating activities, or otherwise generate 
opportunities that enhance children’s well-being. Parental stress from lack of 
resources and material insecurity can compromise parenting skills, leading to 
indifference, neglect, and even abuse. Bad parenting and poor parent-child in-
teractions in turn decrease children’s chances of developing adequate verbal 
skills, strong cognitive ability, and self-control. Deficits in these areas lead chil-
dren to make bad choices that add to their own risk of remaining poor.   
                                                                                                                               
 87. See Erik Turkheimer et al., Socioeconomic Status Modifies Heritability of IQ in Young 
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 88. Id. 
 89. See Guang Guo et al., The Genome-Wide Influence on Human BMI Depends on Physical 
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Variations on these insights are routinely hypothesized and discussed in the 
vast literature on early disadvantage and what to do about it.91 But there is also 
a large body of work that recognizes that innate, genetic factors can shape hu-
man behavior.92 Many of the traits that show deficits among lower SES individ-
uals have been shown to be heritable in varying degrees, and some to a 
significant extent.93 These traits frequently influence social skills and interac-
tions, including parenting practices. Indeed, the same tendencies that put people 
at risk for poverty may also compromise their ability to function as parents. This 
raises the possibility that the behavioral deficits observed in poor children may 
be generated through complicated combinations of genetic and environmental 
mechanisms. Parents afflicted with traits associated with poverty may be at 
greater risk to engage in poor parenting, and to compromise the quality of the 
family environment in which children grow up.94 Likewise, poor children may 
inherit an enhanced risk of behavioral impairments directly from their parents 
through genetic transmission, or can develop those deficits from inadequate par-
enting influenced by similar parental genetic endowments, or can be shaped by 
some combination of these.95 But the important point is that external forces, in-
cluding material deprivation, may not be the sole or even the dominant mecha-
nism by which poor parents produce poor children. Rather, adverse genetic traits 
may be transmitted to offspring directly, independently of inadequate parenting. 
These can contribute to the behaviors and deficits that impede children’s ability 
to function effectively in society and avoid poverty in adulthood. 
A. James Thompson’s Critique of the Noble Brain Size Study 
 The literature to date looking at the neuroscience of poverty does little or 
nothing to disentangle potential genetic and environmental explanations for the 
observed brain and behavioral profiles of disadvantaged children. This signature 
shortcoming is laid bare by an illuminating online conversation between James 
Thompson, a noted British psychometrician, and Professor Kimberly Noble, a 
Columbia University developmental neuroscientist, on the topic of her coau-
thored 2015 paper in Nature Neuroscience, described above.96 The Noble study 
found that family income and parental education were associated with brain size 
and surface area, with children deprived on some SES measures observed to 
have smaller brains.97 The thrust of James Thompson’s critique of the Noble 
                                                                                                                               
 91. For a comprehensive review, see, e.g., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 
5, at 250–66. See also Council on Cmty. Pediatrics, supra note 75 (comprehensive statement of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, containing an overview of presumed social and environmental 
causes of the detrimental effects of child poverty).  
 92. See, e.g., Pinker, supra note 80; Afterward to THE BLANK SLATE, supra note 81. 
 93. See, e.g., Plomin et al., supra note 81 (providing a list of personality and behavioral traits 
that have been shown to have a large heritable component, and reviewing the literature on behavioral 
genetic evidence). 
 94. See id. at 11; see also FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 268. 
95. FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 286. 
 96. See Noble et al., supra note 53, at 773; see also James Thompson, Income, Brain, Race, 
and a Big Gap, UNZ REV. [PSYCHOL. COMMENTS] (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.unz.com/ 
jthompson/income-brain-race-and-big-gap/. 
97. Noble et al., supra note 53, at 777. 
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study, laid out in a widely read blog called Psychological Comments,98 was di-
rected at remarks made by the authors in both the results and discussion sections 
of their paper elaborating on the broader social significance of the reported find-
ings.99  
Although noting the authors’ disclaimer that “it is unclear what is driving 
the links between SES and brain structure,” Thompson highlights the papers’ 
uncritical tone and lopsided emphasis on environmental explanatory factors, 
including “ongoing disparities in postnatal experience or exposures, such as 
family stress, cognitive stimulation, environmental toxins or nutrition,” and 
“corresponding differences in the prenatal environment.”100 The core of 
Thompson’s objection is that the authors failed to consider the possible role of 
genetic variation as an explanation for the SES-related differences in brain size 
and cognitive and behavioral capacities they observed. Thompson states (in 
commenting on the discussion section of the paper): “You will note that 
inherited characteristics are not mentioned in this important section. Not a single 
word. It seems to have escaped notice that the apparent SES/brain link might 
both be driven by a common factor of inherited intelligence.”101 Thompson’s 
complaint, in effect, is that the paper should have at least discussed the 
possibility that the environmental factors measured in the study (education and 
family income) might not be the sole, or even the most important, cause of the 
observed SES-related morphological gradients.102 Rather, a genetic mechanism 
could be contributing to the observed differences. Adults with innate tendencies 
to smaller brains might be less smart, hence increasing their risk of poverty. 
Those adults would tend to pass on genes for reduced brain size (and the re-
sulting diminished cognitive capacity) to their children, thus generating the ob-
served correlation between parental poverty and smaller brains in children.103 
                                                                                                                               
 98. The Psychological Comments blog has now migrated to and been absorbed into the Unz 
Review website. For an archive of James Thompson’s blog entries, see James Thompson Archive, 
UNZ REV., http://www.unz.com/author/james-thompson/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2017).  
99. Thompson, supra note 96.  
 100. Id. (quoting Noble et al., supra note 53, at 777). In support of his critique, Dr. Thompson 
quotes this paragraph from the Noble paper’s discussion section:  
We found that parental education was linearly associated with children's total brain sur-
face area, implying that any increase in parental education, whether an extra year of high 
school or college, was associated with a similar increase in surface area over the course 
of childhood and adolescence. Family income was logarithmically associated with sur-
face area, implying that, for every dollar in increased income, the increase in children’s 
brain surface area was proportionally greater at the lower end of the family income spec-
trum. Furthermore, surface area mediated links between income and children's perfor-
mance on certain executive function tasks.  
Id. Thompson reads these comments as implying “that an extra year of education might increase the 
surface area of the brain,” and likewise that providing more material resources would be expected 
to have the same effect. Id. In other words, the passage strongly implies that the brain size reduction 
observed among low SES children could be eliminated by improving social conditions, which in 
turn points to an exclusively external cause for the observed deficits. 
 101. Id.  
102. Id.  
103. Id.  
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 In fact, as Thompson concedes, Noble and her coauthors do not ignore 
genes altogether.104 Genetic factors figure in the authors’ decision to control for 
genetic group ancestry (as a proxy for race) in their analysis of the data. Al-
though the paper is somewhat evasive on the reasons for this choice, it does 
acknowledge that “brain morphology differs, at least subtly, among different 
ancestry groups.”105 Based on this statement and the background literature, 
Thompson infers that the authors introduced controls to deal with average racial 
group differences, observed in previous research and presumably also in No-
ble’s sample, in brain surface area, size, and morphology. Even with group an-
cestry differences factored out, however, the authors still find that brain surface 
area varied systematically with some aspects of SES.106 In commenting on this 
result, Noble and her coauthors state: 
[A]lthough the inclusion of genetic ancestry does not preclude the possibility 
that these findings [i.e., the results reported in their paper] may reflect, in part, 
an unmeasured heritable component, it reduces as far as possible the likelihood 
that apparent SES effects were mediated by genetic ancestry factors associated 
with SES in the population.107 
Thompson faults this assertion as misleading, because, although somewhat am-
biguous, it strongly suggests that genes associated with ancestry (as a rough 
proxy for race) are the only ones that count in producing brain surface area dif-
ferences in the study subjects. Ergo, any remaining surface area differences (that 
is, those correlating with SES, independent of ancestry) must be traceable to 
environmental factors. As he explains, although “the paper has done well to in-
clude a genomic version of race,” that inclusion “does not cover the major factor 
of intelligence being heritable in all genetic groups.”108 In other words, it “does 
not correct for the overall heritability of intelligence and the heritability of other 
characteristics like brain size in [the] study children.”109 As Thompson summa-
rizes, “[T]he paper and the comments will lead readers to believe that lack of 
money is stunting the brains of poorer children. This is possible, but not proved 
by this study because of obvious genetic confounders. The authors should have 
made [this] clearer.”110  
                                                                                                                               
104. Id.  
 105. Noble et al., supra note 53, at 774.  
106. Id. at 776–77.  
 107. Id. at 777. The authors add at another point that “brain morphology differs, at least subtly, 
among different ancestry groups. Thus it is often difficult to rule out the possibility that genetic 
ancestry mediates associations between SES and brain morphological differences.” Id. at 774. 
 108. Thompson, supra note 96; see also James Thompson, Howitzer or Katyusha: Reply to 
Prof Noble, UNZ REV. [PSYCHOL. COMMENTS] (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.unz.com/jthompson/ 
howitzer-or-katyusha-reply-to-prof-noble/ [hereinafter Thompson, Howitzer or Katyusha] (reiter-
ating that “heritability of behaviour and abilities” is a central idea missing from Noble’s paper).  
 109. Thompson, Howitzer or Katyusha, supra note 108. 
 110. Thompson, supra note 96. Steven Pinker makes a similar point in his succinct critique of 
the same Noble paper: 
Another study found that the surface area of children’s brains correlates with family income, and 
concluded that ‘wider access to resources likely afforded by the more affluent may lead to differences 
in a child’s brain structure’—never entertaining the possibility (in fact well-supported by behavioral 
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 Thompson concludes that the failure to give equal time to alternative ge-
netic mechanisms of causation, net of specific markers of ancestry, represents a 
significant flaw in the authors’ presentation of their research. He is especially 
skeptical of any attempt to draw conclusions, or even to speculate, about broader 
implications for interventions or policies designed to address the behavioral 
problems associated with poverty.111 In this vein, he criticizes as unfounded the 
authors’ statement that “by elucidating the structural brain differences associ-
ated with socioeconomic disparities, we may be better able to identify more pre-
cise . . . targets for intervention, with the ultimate goal of reducing 
socioeconomic disparities in development and achievement.”112 Likewise, he 
questions the authors’ observation that “policies targeting families at the low 
end of the income distribution may be most likely to lead to observable differ-
ences in children’s brain and cognitive development”113 and disparages the as-
sertion that “many leading social scientists and neuroscientists believe that 
policies reducing family poverty may have meaningful effects on children’s 
brain functioning and cognitive development.”114  
Thompson’s argument is that nothing in Noble’s research establishes that 
observed SES differences in brain morphology are actually caused by environ-
mental factors. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness 
of manipulating the environment to reduce poverty. His point comports with the 
reasoning, already noted, that establishing causation has important implications 
for policy. If actual deprivation, neglect, and lack of resources are the only or 
main causes of smaller brains, then relieving those conditions should result in 
larger brains and the superior capacities associated with them.115 But if those 
conditions are not important—if size is largely preprogrammed in the brain—
                                                                                                                               
genetics) that children might inherit genes that made their parents bigger-brained, hence smarter, 
hence richer. 
Afterward to THE BLANK SLATE, supra note 81 (manuscript at 3) (quoting Noble’s coauthor, 
Elizabeth Sowell, Dir., Developmental Cognitive Neuroimaging Lab. (News Release, Family 
Income, Parental Education Related to Brain Structure in Children and Adolescents, CHILD. 
HOSPITAL L.A. (Mar. 30, 2015), https://secure.chla.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=ipINKTOAJs 
G&b=7632571&ct=14553967&notoc=1#.WOVqe2_yuUl)). Pinker likened Noble’s inferences to the 
dubious conclusion, from the fact that “detached and neglectful parents had more maladjusted chil-
dren” that “of course . . . ‘parenting matters.’” Id.  
111. Thompson, supra note 96.  
 112. Id. (quoting Noble et al., supra note 53, at 778). 
 113. Id. (quoting Noble et al., supra note 53, at 777). 
 114. Id. (quoting Noble et al., supra note 53, at 778). In a similar vein, Noble and her coauthors 
state in the results section of the paper that  
[i]t is possible that, in these regions, associations between parent education and chil-
dren’s brain surface area may be mediated by the ability of more highly educated parents 
to earn higher incomes, thereby having the ability to purchase more nutritious foods, 
provide more cognitively stimulating home learning environments, and afford higher 
quality child care settings or safer neighborhoods, with more opportunities for physical 
activity and less exposure to environmental pollutants and toxic stress . . . . It will be 
important in the future to disambiguate these proximal processes by measuring home, 
family and other environmental mediators. 
Noble et al., supra note 53, at 775. 
 115. Thompson, supra note 96; see also supra pp. 253–54 and infra p. 266. 
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then preventing adverse environmental conditions cannot be assumed to im-
prove outcomes. Until these possibilities are sorted out, speculation about 
whether particular policies or interventions can reduce the effects of poverty is 
thus unwarranted.  
B. Genes and Environment in Deprivation Neuroscience 
 The Thompson blog commentary on the Noble study is instructive in laying 
bare the ambiguities inherent in the deprivation neuroscience literature, the for-
midable difficulties of disentangling internal from external mechanisms, and the 
choice by the papers’ authors, unjustified in Thompson’s view, to spotlight en-
vironmental causes to the detriment of potential genetic influences. However, 
Thompson’s comment considers only one paper. A key question is whether the 
Noble study’s handling of the issue of genetic vs. environmental interactions is 
emblematic of the approach adopted in this area of neuroscience generally. A 
survey of the field so far suggests that, although researchers in neuroscience and 
other cognate areas have not entirely ignored the existence of innate influences 
or so-called “selection effects,” the dominance of environmental factors and am-
bient conditions in producing observed brain and behavioral problems is gener-
ally assumed.116 Some researchers neglect even to acknowledge a possible role 
for innate influences117 whereas others mention them only in passing or with 
brief, boilerplate disclaimers.118 So, for example, in a paper on the association 
between SES and performance on memory tasks, the authors state, without fur-
ther elaboration, that the effects observed “may be due to the heritability of ac-
quired memory ability across SES.”119 Likewise, in reviewing the anatomical 
correlates of reading ability disparities across social class, another group of au-
thors notes, without further comment or documentation, that “[t]he possibility 
exists that the SES variable in this study was [partly] a measure of interactive 
genetic and environmental factors . . . including parents’ genetically limited lin-
guistic capacity.”120 Notwithstanding these brief acknowledgments, genetic 
transmission is rarely emphasized or discussed in any detail. The extensive lit-
erature on behavioral genetics and the heritability of particular traits and skills 
is given cursory treatment or, most often, simply ignored. James Thompson 
sizes up the situation:  
As opposed to the genetics plus environment position, the dominant position 
in much of contemporary psychology seems to be the sociological argument, 
which gives precedence to social class, income, wealth and power. The argu-
ment goes thus: class strongly influences living circumstances; those living 
                                                                                                                               
 116. See, e.g., FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 286; Council on Cmty. 
Pediatrics, supra note 75, at 2.  
 117. See, e.g., Raizada et al., supra note 65, at 1392; Stevens et al., supra note 70; Stevens et 
al., supra note 72.  
 118. See, e.g., Mark A. Eckert et al., Planar Asymmetry Tips the Phonological Playground 
and Environment Raises the Bar, 72 CHILD DEV. 988, 997 (2001); Douglas Herrman & Mary Ann 
Guadagno, Memory Performance and Socio-Economic Status , 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 
113, 116 (1997).  
 119. Herrman & Guadagno, supra note 118.  
 120. Eckert et al., supra note 118.  
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circumstances determine most social outcomes; class casts some people into 
poverty, poverty stunts intellectual development, lower intelligence is a down-
stream effect of class-based poverty, so the best way of dealing with low ability 
is to increase income.121 
 The secondary literature analyzing the implications of the neuroscience 
shows a similar tendency to focus on social circumstances. Although the meth-
odological limitations of the studies warrant equipoise on causation, that neu-
trality is rarely evident. Rather, the tilt towards environment, and the 
downplaying of genetic explanations, is unmistakable. So, for example, a review 
of the deprivation neuroscience findings to date, although acknowledging that 
genetic predispositions vary for the traits under consideration, nonetheless 
chooses to emphasize that “cognitive performance is modified by epigenetic 
mechanisms indicating that experience has a strong influence on gene expres-
sion and resultant phenotypical cognitive traits.”122 The authors provide no ci-
tations or support for their assertion that the influence of “experience”—
including, presumably, SES—on the traits in question is generally “strong,”—
as opposed to modest or weak.123 Nor do they analyze particular attributes, or 
the evidence on genetic versus environmental contributions to those attributes, 
on a case by case basis.  
 Similarly, in reviewing deprivation neuroscience research, James Ryan 
acknowledges that genes and environment likely contribute to learning disabil-
ities and intellectual ability generally, and notes that there “may never be” an 
                                                                                                                               
 121. Thompson, Howitzer or Katyusha, supra note 108.  
 122. Hackman & Farah, supra note 20, at 69. The use of the term epigenetics here is poten-
tially misleading, as it promises new insights but in fact adds nothing to the old understanding that 
ambient conditions modify gene expression. According to Steven Pinker, in explaining the recent 
popularity of that term, “the yearning for some biological phenomenon that promises liberation from 
the seemingly fatalistic constraints of evolution and genetics is perennial” making it “inevitable that 
some new research topic would be seized upon as the longed for release. That new topic is epige-
netics.” Afterward to THE BLANK SLATE, supra note 81 (manuscript at 9). As Pinker points out, that 
release is not forthcoming, because epigenetics simply refers to the garden variety environmental 
contributions to phenotype (observed traits or behaviors) that are produced by various environ-
mental influences brought to bear on genetic variants. In other words, epigenetics is the study of 
how environment influences the somatic expression of genes, which is nothing new. According to 
Pinker, “for as long as we’ve known that every cell in the body contains a complete copy of the 
genome, we’ve known that genes must be turned on and off in response to signals from outside the 
cell.” Id.  
 Recent research has added considerable detail to our knowledge of how these influences actu-
ally operate, including the specific modifications in DNA structure and expression that control 
whether particular genes are activated. “Yet,” notes Pinker, “many people react to the uncovering 
of mechanisms of gene regulations as it if were a revolutionary discovery that calls for a rethinking 
of nature and nurture.” Id. According to Pinker, no such rethinking is in order. Specifically, epige-
netic mechanisms are not equivalent to the inheritance of acquired characteristics, or so called “La-
marckian” inheritance. Id. at 10. With only very rare exceptions, environment cannot alter the 
genome of either somatic or germ cells directly. Rather, it influences somatic phenotype, which is 
the individual organism’s expression of a fixed genomic endowment. See id. But genes and envi-
ronment have long been known to interact in this way.  
 123. See also Rao et al., supra note 62. Rao and his coauthors mention genes as a factor in the 
observed correlations between maternal nurturance and hippocampal maturation, but suggest that 
animal cross-fostering studies support relatively weak genetic influences compared to environ-
mental factors. Id. at 1149. 
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answer to the question of “whether and how poverty impacts cognitive devel-
opment.”124 He nonetheless proceeds to make extensive recommendations for 
reforming the legal treatment of learning-disabled children, on the assumption 
that relieving poverty will address the cognitive and learning deficits associated 
with poverty. But that assumption is dubious if the difficulties low income 
children experience in the classroom are not chiefly the result of their poverty 
and its accompanying disadvantages.125 Yet another comprehensive review 
acknowledges a range of opinions and estimates on the relative contribution of 
genes versus environment to “the variability of ability and personality found in 
the population”126 and notes that some psychometricians believe “that the de-
velopmental consequences of persistent family environmental influences, such 
as socioeconomic status and parenting, are remarkably small.”127 The review 
nonetheless puts forth recommendations for a host of new policies and compre-
hensive, expensive interventions designed to alleviate the detrimental effects of 
low SES. The relevance of genetic causes or selection effects to the potential 
efficacy of this list of recommendations is not addressed.128 
 
 This Part has thus far emphasized what researchers say about the implica-
tions of their work. The tendency to stress environmental factors, often to the 
exclusion of others, is understandable. Broad public interest in the studies, and 
especially the willingness to provide public funding to support expensive re-
search, often depends on identifying concrete payoffs in the form of interven-
tions, policies, and practical programs. But as the analysis above of the 
Kimberly Noble brain size study reveals, what deprivation neuroscience re-
searchers say about their work is often seriously out of sync with what their 
studies actually show. The methods and results, not the discussion section, are 
the heart of any scientific work. Although sometimes acknowledging causal un-
certainty, the studies considered here do little or nothing to resolve that uncer-
tainty. They generally make no effort to parse out environmental versus genetic 
factors or to assign a precise role to each.  
In fact, these studies are not designed to accomplish that task. The main 
reason, as the researchers themselves sometimes acknowledge, is that sorting 
                                                                                                                               
 124. James E. Ryan, Poverty as Disability and the Future of Special Education Law, 101 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1455, 1480 (2013); see also Jennifer H. Suor et al., Tracing Differential 
Pathways of Risk: Associations Among Family Adversity, Cortisol, and Cognitive Functioning in 
Childhood, 86 CHILD DEV. 1142 (2015); Maggie M. Sweitzer et al., Polymorphic Variation in the 
Dopamine D4 Receptor Predicts Delay Discounting as a Function of Childhood Socioeconomic 
Status: Evidence for Differential Susceptibility, 8 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
499, 499 (2013) (citing literature suggesting a heritable component to behavioral discount rates).  
 125. For more extensive discussion of the Ryan paper, see infra Section IV.B. 
 126. FROM NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 5, at 287. 
 127. Id. at 287–88; see id. at 286 (discussing the “parents don’t matter” school of behavioral 
genetics). 
 128. Id. ch. 13 (“Promoting Healthy Development through Intervention”) and ch. 14 
“Conclusions and Recommendations”); see also Council on Cmty. Pediatrics, supra note 75.  
 The Poverty of the Neuroscience of Poverty 
 
 
WINTER 2017 263 
out these variables presents formidable methodological challenges that the tech-
niques used in the field are simply not equipped to meet.129 To the extent that 
researchers are working on separating environmental and genetic causes of hu-
man behavior, the most promising routes do not lie within the ambit of depri-
vation neuroscience as currently practiced, which is focused on establishing 
simple correlations among brain morphology, brain function, social back-
ground, and behavioral traits. Rather, as elaborated below, the field of behav-
ioral genetics offers the most promise for disentangling the influence of genes 
and environment and exploring their interaction. The cumbersome behavioral 
methods of comparing twins and siblings, which have been in use for decades, 
have recently been supplemented by sophisticated techniques of genome-wide 
DNA analysis. These new methods are made possible by dramatic advances in 
DNA sequencing and the accumulation of genomic data from large human pop-
ulations. 
 The limited potential of deprivation studies to disentangle the role of nature 
and nurture can be demonstrated by considering how the experimental design 
of this research could be altered or supplemented to better illuminate causa-
tion.130 Emblematic of the difficulties of using standard neuroscience techniques 
for this purpose is James Thompson’s suggestion, as part of his critique of No-
ble’s 2015 study as detailed above, that measuring the intelligence or brain mor-
phology, or both, of the mothers of children in the study might help to gauge the 
possible genetic contribution to the SES-related brain surface gradient her group 
observed. In response, Noble defended the failure to collect the suggested data 
by observing that even though the genetic endowments of parents and children 
may be correlated, “so are parent-child environments.”131 In other words, the 
mothers’ measured IQ does not simply reflect her genetic endowment, but also 
her upbringing. And the mothers of poor children were more likely to grow up 
poor themselves. Thus, even if the researchers saw an association between ma-
ternal IQ and children’s brain size and cognitive functioning, that would still not 
enable them to make a definitive determination about whether the children’s 
characteristics were mostly controlled by genes or environment. Likewise, 
Noble noted, “scanning the parents would not solve the problem either, as pa-
rental brain morphometry would be both genetically and environmentally influ-
enced as well.”132  
 Noble is correct that the additional data on mothers, although potentially 
helpful, is at best an imperfect method for disentangling the genetic versus en-
vironmental determinants of the brain size and morphology disparities that were 
the focus of her study. But that limitation applies to the specific study at hand, 
which uses techniques of brain scanning and behavioral testing on a relatively 
                                                                                                                               
 129. Kimberly Noble, Income, Brain, Race: Prof Kimberly Noble Replies, UNZ REV. (Apr. 17, 
2015), http://www.unz.com/jthompson/income-brain-race-prof-kimberly-noble/ [https://perma.cc/ 
BF5S-K7FZ].  
 130. See generally Hackman, supra note 9 (discussing the roles of nature and nurture in the 
experimental design of deprivation research).  
 131. Noble, supra note 129.  
 132. Id.  
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small number of subjects. In fact, behavioral geneticists have employed a variety 
of empirical methods, devised and refined over decades, for teasing out genetic 
and environmental components for a wide range of traits. The classic “gold 
standard” approach is to collect data on monozygotic twins who are separated 
early in life and adopted into different families.133 Valuable evidence can also 
be obtained by tracking siblings separated at birth, and comparing them statisti-
cally to separated identical twins and unrelated individuals.134 But natural adop-
tion experiments and analyses of sibling data have always offered only limited 
promise because of pitfalls inherent in their retrospective design.135 These 
studies are plagued by erratic record keeping, imperfect datasets, omitted varia-
bles, small numbers of sample points (now reduced even further by the decline 
of single mothers choosing to give up their children for adoption), and the re-
strictions in the SES range of adoptive parents (few of whom are poor).136  
 Lately, rapid developments in genome-wide DNA sequencing have revital-
ized research in behavioral genetics. By generating large data bases and libraries 
of human DNA profiles, scientists have been able to accumulate information on 
human variation over numerous individuals from disparate populations. This 
evidence has formed the basis for genome-wide frequency analysis of genes and 
alleles, which can be statistically linked to anatomical and behavioral character-
istics observed in specific populations. So called “genome-wide association 
studies” enable scientists to pinpoint genetic sequences associated with partic-
ular traits, and to infer the profile of genetic influences on those traits.137  
 As already noted, the interaction of genetics and environment has implica-
tions for the practical payoff of policies and interventions designed to address 
                                                                                                                               
 133. For studies on twins and antisocial behavior, see generally JOHN C. LOEHLIN & ROBERT 
C. NICHOLS, HEREDITY, ENVIRONMENT, & PERSONALITY: A STUDY OF 850 SETS OF TWINS (1976); 
MICHAEL C. NEALE & LON R. CARDON, METHODOLOGIES FOR GENETIC STUDIES OF TWINS AND 
FAMILIES (1992); Soo Hyun Rhee & Irwin D. Waldman, Genetic and Environmental Influences on 
Antisocial Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of Twin and Adoption Studies, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 490 
(2002); Pinker, supra note 80, at 14. Pinker notes that through studies of twins and adoptees, behav-
ioral geneticists have “discovered that in fact virtually all behavioral traits are partly (although never 
completely) heritable” and cites references. Id. at 14, 14 n.24. 
 134. For a description, see generally Robert Plomin, Behavioral Genetic Methods, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY 226, 239–40 (1986).  
 135. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Haugaard & Cindy Hazan, Adoption as a Natural Experiment, 15 
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 909, 912 (2003) (“Behavior genetics has been criticized on several 
grounds. . . . [including that] estimates of genetic influence differ, depending on how heterogeneous 
or homogeneous a sample is. Also, for twins reared apart, it is assumed that their environments are 
uncorrelated; however, criteria for screening potential adoptive families may result in the twins 
being adopted by families with similar characteristics, thus making their environments similar along 
many dimensions.”).  
 136. For a brief discussion on a few of these challenges, see id. at 910–13. 
 137. For a description of genome-wide association (GWA) studies, see generally Dana B 
Hancock et al., Meta-Analyses of Genome-Wide Association Studies Identify Multiple Loci 
Associated with Pulmonary Function, 42 NATURE GENETICS 45 (2010); M. Luciano et al., Genome-
Wide Scan of IQ Finds Significant Linkage to a Quantitative Trait Locus on 2Q , 36 BEHAV.  
GENETICS 45, 45 (2006); Teri A. Manolio, Genomewide Association Studies and Assessment of the 
Risk of Disease, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 166, 166 (2010); Cornelius A. Rietveld et al., Common 
Genetic Variants Associated with Cognitive Performance Identified Using the Proxy-Phenotype 
Method, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13790, 13791 (2014); Austin L. Hughes, Me, My Genome, 
and 23andMe, 40 NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2013 at 3, 9. 
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the purported effects of deprivation, which are the focus of discussions of the 
social implications of deprivation neuroscience. And the efficacy of any partic-
ular measure will be a function of whether the deficits sought to be prevented 
are due mostly to poverty or represent the expression of genetic propensities that 
happen to be more common among the poor. Apart from the genomic analytic 
techniques already detailed, another way to bypass the nature-nurture conun-
drum is to go directly to the practical question of whether specific proposed 
external interventions can alleviate observed deficits. The gold standard ap-
proach to establishing the efficacy of interventions (thereby obviating the need 
to determine external versus genetic causation directly) is to conduct controlled 
prospective clinical trials. In fact, in her dialogue with James Thompson, Kim-
berly Noble suggested as much by stating that “the bottom line is that, to truly 
establish the direction of causality, we need a random experiment.”138 She an-
nounced plans to conduct a study in which “a sample of low-income mothers 
will be randomized upon the birth of their child to receive a large or small 
monthly income supplement.”139 The families would then be followed longitu-
dinally “to estimate the causal impact of an unconditional cash transfer on chil-
dren’s cognitive, emotional and brain development.” This design “will provide 
definitive evidence on the extent to which young children’s cognitive and brain 
development is affected by poverty reduction.”140 In other words, if the children 
of poor families receiving cash transfers show significantly larger brains and 
better cognitive functioning than SES-matched controls who do not receive the 
benefits, that result would strongly suggest that lack of money is responsible for 
the adverse effects. 
 This plan is promising as far as it goes. The problem is that it does not go 
very far. Prospective efficacy trials are not an all-purpose solution to the 
problem of selection effects because the potential for randomized controlled tri-
als to illuminate the causes and cures for SES-related deficits is strictly limited. 
Trials are a feasible approach when interventions are straightforward, easily ma-
nipulated, and fully within researchers’ control (such as handing families extra 
money). At most, simple interventions (such as the income supplement pro-
posed by Kimberly Noble) may offer the potential to answer some discrete 
policy questions.  
 Unfortunately, many aspects of low SES resist correction.141 The contribu-
tors to disadvantage are complex, poorly understood, and difficult or unethical 
to manipulate. Children cannot be assigned to different families, home environ-
ments, cultures, neighborhoods, or parents.142 Given these realities, researchers 
will never be able to provide complete answers to most of the crucial questions, 
including whether and to what extent parenting style directly causes, or is 
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merely associated with, traits found more frequently in lower SES populations. 
And if parental behaviors and parenting styles that actually affect children’s out-
comes have a strong heritable component, they may well resist researchers’ ef-
forts to modify them.143  
 For all these reasons, prospective controlled trials have limited potential to 
illuminate effective interventions. In the absence of such trials, researchers are 
thrown back on classic twin/sibling studies or statistical techniques applied to 
existing datasets on brains, SES, and behavior.144 As noted, statistical analyses 
of descriptive data for the purpose of teasing out causal factors are always sub-
ject to imperfections, including undetected or omitted variables, yielding results 
that are ambiguous, unreliable, or simply unrevealing.145 Although the expan-
sion of genome-wide analysis offers great promise for identifying the genetic 
basis of common human traits and variations, that promise lies largely in the 
future.146 The main point, though, is that the studies that will end up illuminating 
the origins of the biology and behavior correlated with SES represent an exten-
sion of the large and growing body of work generated by behavioral genetics. 
This research stands outside the ambit of deprivation neuroscience as currently 
practiced.  
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 As already noted, the relative contribution of innate versus environmental 
factors to any behavioral deficit associated with a deprived upbringing has im-
portant implications for public policies and interventions designed to help the 
disadvantaged. As the Thompson critique of the Noble study suggests, a signif-
icant role for genetic transmission in producing deficits associated with lower 
SES implies that the behavioral and brain effects of external factors like poverty 
might be modest; and therefore, efforts to enhance poor children’s performance 
by improving their circumstances might show little effect.  
 To be sure, the existence of a heritable component does not rule out allevi-
ation through improved environmental conditions. Because genetic tendencies 
and environment interact, enriching children’s circumstances might help. But 
until the degree of genetic influence, and indeed the full range of reactivity to 
environmental inputs over the relevant population, is actually elucidated, the 
effects of any measures designed to ease disadvantage cannot be predicted. If it 
turns out that poverty and its attendant conditions are not a major or important 
cause of particular deficits—if the deficits are simply correlated with those so-
cial circumstances—then preventing poverty and reducing disadvantage will not 
do much to address the associated behavioral difficulties, and policies that are 
designed to improve on developmental conditions may have a modest or negli-
gible effect. As noted, the vast majority of suggestions and recommendations 
that make reference to deprivation neuroscience are geared towards preventing 
and improving on the circumstances that supposedly cause harm in the first 
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place. On that score, the state of the science, and its inability to identify causal 
mechanisms, counsels a noncommittal, or at least extremely cautious, stance 
towards any practical recommendations that might be gleaned from research on 
the brains of disadvantaged individuals.  
 A similar caution is in order with respect to measures to cure the effects of 
poverty once they occur. Regardless of the causal mechanism, neuroscience, as 
now conducted, is virtually useless in identifying effective interventions after 
the fact. That is because, even if the research could establish that poverty com-
promises the brain, and even if the specific neurochemical mechanisms of that 
compromise were elucidated, those insights do not necessarily point the way to 
a cure—that is, to the specific measures that will reverse the cognitive and be-
havioral effects of a deprived upbringing once they occur.147  
To be sure, fixing damaged brains appears to implicate neuroscientific 
knowledge. For example, it would be at least theoretically possible to develop a 
pill to rebuild lost synapses, enlarge the number of functioning brain cells, or 
multiply or re-establish connections damaged by early adversity. But the depri-
vation neuroscience now being conducted, and neuroscience in general, offers 
no realistic promise for such developments. Undoing the damage to deprived 
brains is not even remotely on the horizon, and the possibility of discovering 
how to do this is pure speculation. Additionally, even if the actual neurophysi-
ological or neurochemical mechanisms could eventually be worked out in suf-
ficient detail, behavioral studies are nonetheless an indispensable step towards 
discovering and describing those mechanisms, because only behavioral studies 
can reveal the real-world effects of any particular intervention. Whether some 
kind of direct manipulation of the brain reverses the damage done by environ-
mental factors must be established empirically on a case by case basis, using 
trial and error. There is no substitute for the process of connecting external 
interventions to the kinds of behavioral improvements that policymakers are 
seeking. 
 In the absence of techniques to manipulate brains directly, we are thrown 
back on trying to control the ambient social circumstances that produce or per-
petuate disadvantage, or to create the real-life experiences that can cure its neg-
ative effects. Unfortunately, even if brain science can help identify the complex 
social inputs that harm or benefit the brain, it can tell us nothing about how to 
prevent or produce them. Thus, even apart from the difficulties of teasing out 
genetic vs. environmental causation, it is doubtful that neuroscience can help 
inform policies towards the disadvantaged and shape the interventions under-
taken to assist them. When it comes to identifying measures to alleviate poverty 
and its effects, the study of the brain’s structure, function, and chemistry offers 
no insights over and above those gleaned from behavioral studies coupled with 
the generic understanding, long predating recent neuroscientific work, that dis-
tinct brain states underlie different observed behaviors. Nor can brain science 
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tell us how to bring about the changes in society that will improve conditions 
for the poor. 
 It is not surprising, then, that the reviews and articles that claim to offer 
recommendations that come out of, and are informed by, neuroscientific re-
search (and deprivation neuroscience in particular) suffer from a signal defect. 
They fail to explain how knowledge of the brain’s structure and function points 
uniquely, over and above cognitive and behavioral observations, to particular 
programs or interventions. Likewise, they are vague on how specific program-
matic recommendations follow from the content of neuroscientific discoveries. 
All told, the literature shows that neuroscience is of no help in formulating ef-
fective policies to address poverty and its effects. And the recommendations that 
commentators purport to derive from deprivation neuroscience could be—and 
have been—put forward as plausibly without the benefit of that body of work.148 
Indeed, the agenda commentators favor, which stresses governmentally funded 
and coordinated services and programs, is no more consistent with, or compelled 
by, existing studies than alternative, more traditional, approaches to the social 
problem of poverty. 
A. Addressing Poverty and Its Effects 
 Illustrating this point requires a review of claims made on behalf of depri-
vation neuroscience. What do papers reporting and commenting on the research 
say about the pragmatic implications of this work? As documented above, while 
not denying genetic inputs altogether, the neuroscience reports themselves tend 
to emphasize the environmental over the innate. The secondary literature that 
seeks to glean recommendations from the science likewise tilts towards as-
suming the dominance of environmental factors and, thus, finds a broad ambit 
for programmatic interventions.149 
 The basic neuroscience literature itself, in contrast with commentaries from 
related fields or journalistic reports, tends to be somewhat circumspect about 
the implications of the research for policy. Most primary research papers refrain 
from identifying specific payoffs, and stick to open-ended predictions, isolated 
observations, and vaguely expressed expectations. Not atypical is the statement 
in one article that “[g]reater knowledge about the developmental timing of risk 
exposures and brain development would be extremely valuable for informing 
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interventions.”150 A different research study expressed the hope (as yet unreal-
ized) of discovering an effective “pharmacological intervention,”151 while an-
other offered a general reassurance that none of the findings reported imply 
immutability, or resistance to effective correctives.152 Yet another report touted 
programmatic efforts designed to “enhance cognitive stimulation,”153 whereas 
two others advance the general assertion that developmental neuroscience holds 
promise for redesigning public and educational programs for the disadvan-
taged.154  
In a similar vein, Farah and colleagues, in a review of the ethical and policy 
implications of the data, acknowledge the difficulties of “disentangling cause 
and effect,” but state that “[t]he issue of whether and to what extent SES differ-
ences cause neurocognitive differences or vice versa should not be confused 
with the issue of whether we have an obligation to help children of any back-
ground become educated productive citizens.”155 Another paper reviewing re-
search and future directions suggests that neuroscientific findings so far have 
“opened new avenues for innovation in the design of interventions” to address 
the brain effects of childhood poverty.156 In sum, a general endorsement of ac-
tive intervention to help disadvantaged children is a commonplace in these arti-
cles. What is notably lacking are specifics on which interventions would be 
helpful, and how neuroscience, qua neuroscience, proves their effectiveness. 
 The papers that get into more detail point to a familiar litany of proposals 
that have long been popular staples of the broader policy literature on child de-
velopment, and that almost always predate the neuroscience research in ques-
tion. One study looking at the effects of early deprivation on the structure of the 
hippocampus asserts that “[t]he finding that the effects of poverty on hippo-
campal development are mediated through caregiving and stressful life events 
further underscores the importance of high quality early childhood caregiving.” 
The authors go on to recommend parenting education and preschool programs 
“that provide high-quality supplementary caregiving and safe haven to vul-
nerable young children.”157 Another group touts a cluster of small, intensive, 
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much studied early childhood programs, initiated in the 1970s (the Perry pre-
school program, the Chicago child-parent study, and the Abecedarian project)158 
that, in long-term follow-up, have produced positive, albeit modest, improve-
ments in rates of employment, criminal offending, and marriage, but not cogni-
tive ability.159 Other proposals include visiting nurse programs, Moving to 
Opportunity housing vouchers, intensive cognitive training,160 and cash trans-
fers to single parents.161 Perhaps the most specific recommendation comes from 
the observation by Stevens and her colleagues: underprivileged children are less 
able to suppress distracting sounds when listening to stories and spoken lan-
guage.162 Another study Stevens led developed a training program to counteract 
that effect, for which there is evidence of limited, short-term success.163  
 The discussions of policy in scientific reviews and the secondary literature 
tend to make bolder claims and set out more detailed proposals.164 One book 
length treatment of early child development contains two chapters devoted to a 
lengthy list of recommendations, ranging from specific to vague, that purport to 
grow out of the evidence accumulated across fields, including developmental 
and deprivation neuroscience.165 These are, inter alia, creating “school readiness 
initiatives,” making greater investments in “young children’s mental health 
needs,” creating programs to help parents because “children’s early develop-
ment depends on the health and well-being of their parents,” finding ways to 
reduce chronic stress “stemming from abuse and neglect throughout the early 
childhood years and beyond,” intervening to reduce exposures to poor nutrition, 
infections, environmental toxins, and drugs,166 and providing more generous 
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funding to “improve the qualifications and increase the compensation” for “chil-
dren’s nonparental caregivers.”167 The authors do not explain how this lengthy 
wish list is tied to particular neuroscience findings, as opposed to behavioral 
observations or evidence from social science generally. Nor is data presented on 
the results anticipated from these proposed programs, or how those results can 
be predicted from, or relate to, the studies on deprived children’s brains. 
 In the same vein, Helen Neville and colleagues, in deriving lessons from 
deprivation neuroscience, urge an intensive focus on “developing methods for 
ameliorating” observed SES disparities.168 Alluding to “mechanisms whereby 
SES can influence brain and cognitive development,” the authors conclude that 
“there is ample evidence that this [amelioration] can be done.”169 Their pro-
posals include the familiar list of early childhood programs (Perry Preschool, 
Abecedarian, etc.), parental enrichment, training of school age children to im-
prove attention (as developed by Stevens, et al, discussed above), and family-
based coaching for parents.170 The authors do not offer concrete evidence on the 
effectiveness of these interventions in reducing the SES-related brain differ-
ences documented in the neuroscience literature. 
 Similarly, in a 2011 issue of Science that includes a comprehensive review 
of the neuroscience to date, the editors discuss initiatives to enhance language 
comprehension, reading ability, executive function, memory, and learning gen-
erally.171 Once again, the handful of small, intensive early childhood programs 
(Perry preschool, Abecedarian, Chicago parent-child initiative) is high-
lighted.172 Other proposals include investing in teacher enrichment and quality, 
creating programs aimed at improving parenting and caregiving, and providing 
training designed to enhance children’s self-control, executive function, 
memory, basic reasoning, mindfulness, selective attention, and language 
skills.173 The authors cite a few promising outcome studies, but acknowledge 
that most programmatic interventions have shown equivocal results. Once 
again, the connection to particular neuroscientific data, as opposed to behavioral 
observations or other evidence, is not explored.174  
 In a report on a recent interdisciplinary conference on the policy implica-
tions of developmental and deprivation neuroscience, The Institute for Research 
on Poverty notes that the participants were focused on “identifying ways that 
neuroscience research could be used to provide improved insights about the ef-
fects of poverty and to develop more effective antipoverty policies in response 
to these insights.”175 The document contains many caveats and bemoans the lack 
of standardization in the “norms regarding what types of social, economic, and 
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demographic data are collected in brain studies and how such factors should be 
measured.”176 The report expresses the vague hope that “[n]euroscience studies 
focused on socioeconomic questions could offer the advantage of helping poli-
cymakers design interventions that are better targeted and more cost effective,” 
and that “neuroscience may lead to better insights about whether an intervention 
leads to the intended result.”177 Beyond that, the report is short on the specifics 
of how neuroscience can be put to work to identify interventions that will actu-
ally prove effective in reducing the harmful consequences of poverty. 
 Finally, in a spring 2016 report published in the journal Pediatrics, the 
Council on Community Pediatrics issued a major policy statement from the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, which set forth “Principles to Guide and De-
fine the Child Health Care System and/or Improve the Health of all Children.”178 
While not undertaking a detailed review, the report briefly alluded to behavioral 
and basic science research related to child poverty, and especially to the behav-
ioral effects of toxic stress and adversity.179 The report contained a comprehen-
sive set of recommendations for pediatric practice based on the research 
findings, including enhanced nutrition efforts, home visiting initiatives, parental 
training and support programs, and the expansion and funding for other “essen-
tial benefits programs that assist low-income and poor children,” such as “Early 
Head Start and Head Start, Medicaid, CHIP, WIC, home visiting, SNAP, school 
meal programs and other programs that increase access to healthy food, and 
Child Care Development Block Grant–funded programs.”180  
 The report is accompanied by a separate article that focuses more specifi-
cally on the effects of poverty on the developing brain. After surveying the dep-
rivation neuroscience in extensive detail, this article offers a host of 
programmatic and policy suggestions that are claimed to grow out of its find-
ings, including implications for pediatric practice.181 These include having pri-
mary care providers “evaluate and address social needs such as housing, 
employment, education and food,” as well as “environmental mediators of neu-
rodevelopment” such as “parenting stress, [and] cognitive stimulation.”182 The 
article goes on to propose that pediatricians participate in projects with child 
development specialists to provide “parent-child interaction coaching” and to 
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“support play and shared reading.”183 The report also urges pediatricians to ad-
vocate for “expanding high quality community resources for families, as well as 
coordinated systems to implement them.”184 It suggests that “pediatricians may 
serve as ideal advocates for programs and supports that provide financial bene-
fits to poor families,” and predicts that these measures will produce improve-
ments “in long-term cognitive and health outcomes.”185  
 The article gives few details on how and whether pediatricians’ advocacy 
will actually change poor children’s behavior, brain morphology, or brain func-
tioning. Nor does it provide data on the creation, enactment, and implementation 
of proposed interventions, or describe the concrete results anticipated from 
them. Also lacking is any explanation of how the neuroscientific insights, or any 
of the studies that link scan results to SES and measures of performance, add to 
the already existing body of developmental and behavioral psychology that con-
nects socioeconomic status to outcomes for disadvantaged children. In sum, the 
value added by neuroscience, over and above other knowledge and information, 
is neither explored nor explained, but simply taken for granted. 
 Law professors have also gotten into the business of citing deprivation neu-
roscience to justify legal and policy recommendations. In touting a proactive 
approach to child welfare and arguing against “minimalism” in assisting “at 
risk” children, Professor Claire Huntington maintains that there is a “deeper, 
and less recognized reason to question . . . minimalism,” which is the “growing 
body of research by neuroscientists.”186 She asserts that this research demon-
strates “that a child’s early life experiences and environment literally shape the 
child’s brain architecture, with lifelong consequences that are very difficult to 
reverse,” and also that “[c]hildren’s relationships with their primary caregivers” 
are “at the core of brain development.”187 When these relationships are deficient, 
she states, “the developing child’s brain is deeply affected.”188 The author con-
cludes that, because the science teaches that the brain changes occasioned by 
poor caregiving can be hard to reverse, “prevention is essential.”189 While ac-
knowledging that the field of neuroscience may well be too nascent to form the 
basis of specific proposals,190 she nonetheless puts forward a series of recom-
mendations. She endorses the Nurse-Family Partnership initiative, which ar-
ranges public health nurse visits to low income mothers, as an “example of a 
program that helps foster child brain development.”191 She adds that the research 
“cautions against the removal [from their parents] of young children in all but 
the most serious circumstances” because “the loss of the primary attachment 
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figure for a very young child can be devastating.”192 Thus, “the child welfare 
system should seek to treat the whole family.”193  
 Once again, missing from this exposition is an explanation of how partic-
ular neuroscientific evidence adds to the already existing body of developmental 
and behavioral psychology that establishes the importance of caregiver behavior 
and child-maternal attachment. Nor does Huntington further support her propo-
sition that family preservation, as opposed to a range of other potential responses 
to inadequate caregiving, is better for children. In short, she does not make clear 
how neuroscience contributes, or contributes uniquely, to her conclusions and 
legal recommendations. 
 Ross Thompson is another law professor who has tried his hand at exploring 
the practical payoffs from the emerging body of developmental neuroscience.194 
In a lengthy article on how “understanding . . . the biological foundations of 
human development” has “implications for legal analysis,”195 Thompson rec-
ommends a set of initiatives that he claims grows out of the scientific data. After 
reviewing some of the studies, Thompson concludes that the science reveals 
“complex interactions between brain maturation and experience over time” as 
well as the “importance of early experience, the significance of caregiving 
quality for buffering stress, and the enduring consequences of early adver-
sity.”196 According to Thompson, the evidence of “brain plasticity” carries “the 
most important legal implications,”197 because it “accounts for the efficacy of 
preventative and intervention[al] efforts targeted to children in adversity.”198 It 
follow that measures should be adopted that “contribute to the prevention and 
remediation of conditions of early adversity,” including programs that “focus 
on the early identification of families at risk . . . and the provision of supportive 
services to strengthen the quality of care.”199 These include “home visitation 
programs, nutritional assistance, parental support, access to high quality child 
care, . . . other forms of ‘preventative family preservation.’ . . . well-designed 
early [childhood] education programs that are supplemented by social-
emotional support, and targeted programs to address the specific causes of pa-
rental inadequacy.”200  
 In light of Professor Thompson’s sweeping recommendations, two points 
are worth noting. First, observational studies of behavior, wholly apart from re-
search on brain function, have long tried to establish the importance of early 
conditions of upbringing and yielded similar programmatic suggestions. Indeed, 
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Thompson’s proposals echo those repeatedly advanced by many developmental 
and behavioral psychologists and their political allies, and some have been or 
are being adopted. In short, there is nothing new or surprising here, and no 
special information or observations that bring unique insights to policy. Second, 
as with the other commentaries already discussed, the author does not tie par-
ticular neuroscientific findings to proposed interventional strategies. Nor does 
he link neuroscientific results to behavioral data demonstrating or predicting the 
effectiveness of particular programs.201  
 As a general matter, the secondary literature that purports to find unprece-
dented programmatic insights in developmental neuroscience offers no novel 
suggestions. Rather, it reiterates recommendations that have long been popular 
among developmental experts from a range of social science fields in light of 
long-standing behavioral observations, evidence accumulated over time, or just 
plain common sense. For example, the eminent economist James Heckman, who 
studies human capital and skill formation, has long stressed the importance of 
early intervention to enhance the life-chances of children from deprived back-
grounds. Marshalling the evidence on the efficacy of interventions at different 
stages of childhood and adolescence, he has concluded that, because skill builds 
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ences on health, including the creation of “lasting changes in the brain and the body.” Id. at 29–30. 
While asserting that knowledge of how adversity “disrupt[s] brain circuits” provides “a very exciting 
opportunity to bring biology into early-childhood policy,” the article is hazy on how such insights 
might redirect actual medical practice. Id. at 31 (quoting Professor Jack P. Shonkoff, Harvard 
Medical School). Rather, it echoes the general observation, set out by Huntington and Thompson, 
that “intervening early can improve later outcomes” in health, education, and behavior. Id. The ar-
ticle adds the caveats that experts “are still struggling to figure out how to put this new theory into 
clinical practice” and that “there’s not yet a lot of good data to tell us which kinds of interventions 
are most effective.” Id. 
 Another example of claiming policy payoffs from neuroscience is to be found in a Guardian 
U.K. article reporting on the 2015 Noble study shortly after it was published. Ian Sample, Brain 
Development in Children Could Be Affected by Poverty, Study Shows, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2015, 
11:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/mar/30/brain-development-in-children-
could-be-affected-by-poverty-study-shows. As reported in that article, Michael Thomas, director of 
the Birkbeck-UCL Centre for Educational Neuroscience, suggests that this study and others like it 
“could help researchers tease out more precisely how a low income might affect children’s brains.” 
Thomas adds that “[i]f we find that all these factors are equally responsible, that is prenatal health, 
stress levels, nutrition and cognitive stimulation, the only way to fix the issue is to get rid of poverty, 
and that’s a hard thing to do. But if we can narrow it down to some factors that are particularly 
influential in causing problems for the kids, that makes it more possible to intervene.” Id. He does 
not elaborate further on how neuroscience, as opposed to other behavioral scientific methods, can 
best perform this “narrowing down” function. Id. 
 Finally, a short article appearing in May 2016 in the New York Times reports on a conference 
of leading researchers in the field. The attendees rely upon neuroscience studies, data on stress re-
actions, and the Adverse Childhood Experience study to suggest that the damage to the brains of 
disadvantaged children can be reversed through “city policies like universal prekindergarten,” as 
well as forming “caring, consistent relationships with adults.” Dwyer, supra note 76. The article 
provides no further details of how these specific recommendations follow from particular findings 
in neuroscience, as opposed to knowledge from social science and empirical observation generally.  
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on skill and “early inputs strongly affect the productivity of later inputs,” inter-
ventions designed to alleviate early deprivation provide the most effective re-
sults.202 Although Heckman’s work on child development does not rely on 
neuroscience, the policies he advocates match those recommended by commen-
tators who purport to find startling insights in brain research. In fact, and unsur-
prisingly, brain science simply confirms what we know from behavioral studies. 
It adds nothing to the empirical social science data already available. 
 In addition to reiterating proposals predating the research in deprivation 
neuroscience, the policy schemes that purport to rely on the science are largely 
oblivious to the peculiar obstacles and pragmatic difficulties of influencing pri-
vate behavior, especially within families. The vast majority of proposals are 
geared towards progressive, government-sponsored, collectively coordinated 
programs. They emphasize top-down initiatives and publicly funded efforts, 
without any attention to whether these actually work, or work best, to prevent 
the ill effects attributed to deprivation. Nor do they consider whether social 
problems such as “parental inadequacy” might better be rectified through in-
formal private measures that assign a much smaller role to government. In ne-
glecting alternatives to conventional progressive initiatives, the commentators 
are oblivious to important strands of political and social science thinking, in-
cluding critiques of some forms of governmental aid to the poor as creating per-
verse incentives, promoting bad habits, and discouraging avenues of self-help 
that might prove more effective in the long run.203 For example, there is research 
suggesting that irregular family forms and arrangements, such as multi partner 
fertility, stepparent and mixed parentage families, households where children 
cohabit with nonbiologically related males, and families experiencing serial 
adult partnerships, pose enhanced risks of child abuse and neglect.204 One ap-
proach to that risk is to eschew financial benefits for irregular living arrange-
ments, which may be encouraged by overly generous government subsidies, in 
favor of shoring up, advocating for, and supporting more traditional family 
forms.205  
                                                                                                                               
 202. For a summary of James Heckman’s work on skill development, see James J. Heckman, 
Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disadvantaged Children, 312 SCIENCE 1900 
(2006).  
 203. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND (1984); MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM 
AND THE NIGHTMARE (Encounter Books 2000) (1993); WILLIAM VOEGELI, NEVER ENOUGH: 
AMERICA’S LIMITLESS WELFARE STATE (2d ed. 2012); see also INST. FOR FAMILY, CMTY., & 
OPPORTUNITY, 2016 INDEX OF CULTURE & OPPORTUNITY: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS 
THAT SHAPE AMERICA 47 (Jennifer A. Marshall & Rachel Sheffield eds., 2016) (detailing 
counterproductive and dependence-promoting aspects of welfare and transfer programs), http://thf_ 
media.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/2016IndexofCultureandOpportunity.pdf. 
 204. MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT CINDERELLA: A DARWINIAN 
VIEW OF PARENTAL LOVE 26–36 (1998); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other 
Risks of Not Living with Both Parents, 6 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 197 (1985); Margo I. Wilson, 
Martin Daly, & Suzanne J. Weghorst, Household Composition and the Risk of Child Abuse and 
Neglect, 12 J. BIOSOCIAL SCI. 333 (1980).  
 205. See, e.g., Kay S. Hymowitz, Marriage and Caste in America: Separate and Unequal 
Families in a Post-Marital Age, Heritage Foundation Lectures, Lecture No. 1005 (Mar. 23, 2007), 
http://www1.heritage.org/research/lecture/marriage-and-caste-in-america-separate-and-unequal-families- 
in-a-post-marital-age; see also W. Bradford Wilcox et al., When Marriage Disappears: The Retreat 
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 In choosing between these alternative approaches to helping children avoid 
the ill effects of social disadvantage, deprivation neuroscience has nothing to 
offer. The information gleaned from the science is completely unenlightening 
as to the strategies that would best alleviate the effects of poverty and attendant 
adversities, whether over the short or long term. Nor does it tell us whether sup-
port for traditional families and established structures is more or less effective 
than the standard progressive approach, which relies on government-sponsored 
services and financial handouts for dysfunctional parents and at-risk families. 
In short, whether a given intervention or policy will help or hurt, alleviate the 
cognitive and behavioral problems associated with childhood disadvantage or 
backfire, improve things or make them worse, is not information that neurosci-
ence can provide. Neuroscience is completely uninformative and indeterminate 
on these questions. Yet the implicit assumption behind the articles that prescribe 
policies based on neuroscience seems to be that brain science can tell us what is 
needed, point the way to appropriate interventions, and assure their efficacy. 
These assumptions are dubious at every point. Deprivation neuroscience, in and 
of itself, cannot underwrite any policy proposal nor establish the effectiveness 
of any government-engineered intervention. Only evidence about the concrete 
behavioral and social effects of actual programs, gathered in real time, can do 
that.  
B. Neuroscience and Disabilities Law 
 Advocating for programs to address the social problem of childhood depri-
vation is not the only use to which deprivation neuroscience has been put by the 
legal and policy community. In a lengthy law review article, James Ryan takes 
the position that neuroscientific evidence dictates a fundamental restructuring 
of federal statutes regulating the education of learning disabled children.206 The 
argument, which is well-crafted and thoughtful, merits serious consideration. 
Ultimately, it fails. 
 Although benefits and protections for the disabled are provided under sev-
eral statutory schemes, Ryan is principally concerned with the federal Individ-
uals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which mandates individually 
tailored special education programs for covered students, and protects them 
from certain disciplinary sanctions.207 Ryan finds fault with the IDEA definition 
of covered learning disabilities and the manner in which the definition has been 
interpreted and applied.208 His central contention is that recent findings in dep-
rivation neuroscience show that the scope of the statute’s coverage should be 
expanded.209 
                                                                                                                               
from Marriage in Middle America, Heritage Found. Lectures, Lecture No. 1179 (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2011/02/when-marriage-disappears-the-retreat-from-
marriage-in-middle-america.  
 206. Ryan, supra note 124, at 1503.  
 207. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1444 (2012). 
See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(10)(F)(14) (2012). 
 208. See Ryan, supra note 124, at 1457–58. 
 209. Id. at 1495.  
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 The IDEA protects children with a “disorder in [one] or more of the basic 
psychological processes” that interfere with the ability to “listen, think, speak, 
read, write, spell, or do mathematic calculations.”210 Specified disorders that 
interfere with learning—such as “brain injury, dyslexia, developmental 
aphasia”—are deemed covered, but the statute contains discrete exclusions.211 
Individuals are not considered learning disabled if their deficits are “primarily 
the result . . . of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.”212 Based 
on the statutory definition and exclusions, and in reliance on the consensus of 
disability experts, the IDEA’s protections have been extended almost exclu-
sively to children who meet the so-called “discrepancy” model of disabled 
learning.213 Children conforming to this model characteristically combine an 
overall normal range intelligence with deficits in selective learning-related abil-
ities (such as reading or receptive language).214  
 Ryan’s main target is the exclusion from statutory protection of learning 
deficits associated with (and presumably caused by) social disadvantage.215 
Ryan’s argument centers on a key categorical distinction that, in his view, un-
derwrites the express statutory exclusion of deficits traceable to low SES.216 Al-
though acknowledging that the statute itself does not by its terms distinguish 
between “innate” versus “environmental” causes, Ryan construes the scope of 
the statute’s coverage, at least as it has come to be applied, as turning on this 
distinction.217 Deficits deemed eligible are generally thought to stem from “in-
nate” or purely “internal” influences, whereas the excluded categories—such as 
problems with learning caused by “economic disadvantage”—are those thought 
to be produced primarily by external or environmental forces.218 This divide, he 
argues, can be gleaned from the included and excluded categories, in conjunc-
tion with “neighboring language in the statute.”219 As Ryan sees it, “[t]here also 
appears to be universal agreement among commentators”220 that “real” learning 
disabilities are “an internal disorder, innate to the students.”221 The operating 
assumption is that these types of deficits are rooted in purely biological or neu-
rological defects that are the result of aberrant genes or genetic accidents.222 In 
other words, disabled students are “born that way.” They do not “become that 
way” through the agency of external conditions such as poverty and disad-
vantage. 
 Ryan draws on the findings of deprivation neuroscience to argue that the 
exclusion for learning deficits traceable to external factors such as poverty and 
                                                                                                                               
 210. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (30) (A). 
 211. Id. § 1401 (B), (C). 
 212. Ryan, supra note 124, at 1457 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (30) (C)).  
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. at 1467–68. 
 215. Id. at 1457, 1470–71 
 216. Id. at 1470–72. 
 217. Id. at 1458. 
 218. Id. at 1458, 1466. 
 219. Id. at 1458.  
 220. Id. at 1458 n.14.  
 221. Id. at 1458.  
 222. Id. at 1464, 1480–81. 
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disadvantage, as opposed to intrinsic defects, is unjustified and incoherent, and 
that socially acquired difficulties should be treated the same as learning prob-
lems stemming from other (purely “innate”) causes.223 The neuroscience, he 
claims, shows that “a child’s environment,”224 including low SES, alters brain 
development, structure, and function in “physical mechanistic ways.”225 Those 
effects, argues Ryan, are “no less concrete and real,”226 and of no lesser concern 
for the educational fate and functioning of children, than brain changes due to 
genetics, disease, or exposure to neurotoxins—including the genetically pro-
grammed, “innate,” structural deficits that are thought to lie behind the stylized 
learning disabilities recognized as within the statute’s scope.227  
 Central to Ryan’s thesis is his “challenge [to the] the notion that there is a 
sharp divide between internal and external causes of learning disabilities.”228 
The most important aspect of his argument for our purposes, however, relates 
to how he justifies his position. He states that “the research regarding the effects 
of poverty on brain development” not only calls into question the “entire con-
cept of innate or inherent learning disabilities,” but also any categorical distinc-
tion between deficits that are “innate” and those that are not.229 Because, Ryan 
contends, there is now “scientific” proof that poverty alters the brain, and accu-
mulating evidence on how that process occurs, the IDEA should be rewritten to 
broaden the scope of its protections.  
 Ryan’s argument is marred by some confusion surrounding the word in-
nate. One possible interpretation of that word is that it connotes a purely internal 
cause for the brain state or accompanying behavior at issue, or both. On this 
meaning, an “innate” brain state is one attributed to purely genetic or inherited 
factors (and thus independent of external and environmental influence).230 But 
the word “innate” can also carry a different (and broader) meaning, as simply 
equivalent to “internal,” in the sense of being accompanied by, and determined 
by, a particular brain state, regardless of causation or how that brain state came 
about.231 In this sense, all behaviors are ultimately “innate” in that they all are 
grounded in a corresponding, specific brain state.  
                                                                                                                               
 223. Id. at 1458.  
 224. Id. at 1491.  
 225. Id. (quoting Farah et al., supra note 12, at 285).  
 226. Id. (quoting Farah et al., supra note 12, at 286).  
 227. See id. In attacking the “discrepancy” model of learning disability (LD), Ryan also asserts 
that “researchers consistently [have] found little, if any, difference between those identified as dis-
abled [on this behavioral criterion] and those considered slow learners.” Id. at 1472. According to 
Ryan, many studies have revealed similarities between the two groups across a “host of dimensions, 
including achievement levels, achievement growth, behavior, response to instruction, ‘[and] even a 
broad range of neurobiological factors.’” Id. (quoting Jack M. Fletcher et al., Classification of 
Learning Disabilities: An Evidence-Based Evaluation, in IDENTIFICATION OF LEARNING 
DISABILITIES; RESEARCH TO PRACTICE 231 (Reneé Bradley et al. eds., 2002)). These findings pro-
vide additional support for abandoning the categorical distinctions, including the exclusion for 
poverty-related learning problems, which are inscribed in the law. Id.  
 228. Id. at 1479. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1458–59 
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 Ryan’s use of the term appears to adopt the latter meaning. His principal 
point seems to be that, although the causal path to learning deficits may impli-
cate a spectrum of genetic versus environmental causes, all learning difficulties 
are, in the end “innate,” because they correspond to an alteration or abnormality 
in the “internal” state of the brain.232 What should matter is this end point of the 
brain and how it functions, not how that end point was achieved. There appears 
to be no principled reason to distinguish between different causal pathways (en-
vironmental, genetic, or some mix) leading to the “internal deficiencies or mod-
ifications” in brains that compromise the ability to learn.233 The focus should be 
on the state of the brain that has trouble learning, and not how the brain state 
came about. Given the purpose and goals of the IDEA, the distinction between 
“born” and “made” learning deficits, argues Ryan, is arbitrary and unjustified.234 
Therefore, the law should treat them equally.  
 Ryan acknowledges that his reasoning entails a reductio. All learning dif-
ficulties attributable to environmental influence, or innate factors, or some com-
bination of these, can be candidates for designation as “disabilities,” because all 
shortcomings would appear to have a distinct basis in the brain, whatever the 
source.235 As Ryan puts it (repeating the words of Farah and her colleagues), 
“any difference in cognitive function whether genetic or environmental in 
origin, reflects a difference in brain function.”236 So every learning impairment, 
however defined, can potentially be included under the rubric of “brain dysfunc-
tion.” Ryan acknowledges that this line of reasoning can lead to potentially awk-
ward practical consequences.237 If all behavioral deficits, including all 
diminutions in learning ability regardless of cause, are “written on the brain,” 
then it follows that all would satisfy the criterion of being “internal” or “in-
nate.”238  
 But if that is the case, what is the scope of the category of “learning disa-
bled?” Indeed, because everything that alters the ability to learn “changes the 
brain,” compensable disabilities could result from virtually any factor that in-
fluences learning ability or actual learning. Ryan notes, for example, that inad-
equate instruction throughout the school years can “influence brain development 
and function.”239 Similarly, the failure to enroll in a quality preschool program 
                                                                                                                               
 232. Id. (“The problem today is that the distinction between internal disorders and external 
circumstances is increasingly untenable. Research into the impact of poverty on brain development 
and function suggests that external circumstances, such as living in sustained poverty, can have 
internal effects. To oversimplify, growing up in poverty can physically affect how a child's brain 
develops and functions.”). 
 233. Id. at 1493. 
 234. Id. at 1495. 
 235. See id. Ryan downplays or just ignores the possibility that poverty-related defects may 
stem partly or largely from innate or genetic factors, but that failure makes no real difference to his 
argument. Even if poverty-related difficulties are not, as he seems to assume, wholly “caused” by 
deprivation, that does not undermine his basic point that the current legal regime based on internal 
vs. external causation is dubious. 
 236. Id. at 1497 (quoting Farah et al., supra note 16, at 169). 
 237. Id. at 1496. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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can produce a lifelong lag in subsequent academic achievement. So can growing 
up in a culture that de-emphasizes learning, reading, verbal communication, or 
analytic thought. At the very least, Ryan’s critique threatens to demolish the 
distinction between the learning disabled and “garden variety slow learners” 
who were never meant to be covered by the statute.240 Indeed, if the disabled 
category rightly includes anyone whose performance falls below a certain 
threshold, regardless of the reason, the critical question for the law then becomes 
who is sufficiently impaired to be covered by the IDEA. How far short of normal 
would qualify for preferential treatment? Would a dramatic expansion in the 
category of children entitled to the special protections and extra resources fit in 
with the overall goal of IDEA? It’s hard to know because that goal is not well-
articulated. At the very least, such an expansion would prove highly disruptive 
and expensive for school districts already strapped for funds. Ryan gestures to-
wards these dilemmas without exploring or solving them.  
 Ryan’s critique of the IDEA has much to recommend it. There are many 
good reasons to question the “discrepant learning” model that the IDEA appears 
to adopt. Unfortunately, the lessons of neuroscience are not among them. No 
discoveries from that field justify a critique of this statute’s scope, which stands 
or falls regardless of how poverty alters the brain or deprivation compromises 
the ability to learn. Understanding these mechanisms merely provides particu-
larized evidence for a core materialist axiom: that distinct behaviors correspond 
to different brain states. But that generic insight was already uniformly accepted 
and widely understood before any of the neuroscience research was con-
ducted.241 The specific findings of neuroscience, while supporting the insight, 
add nothing to it. In particular, they provide no independent rationale for im-
pugning the IDEA’s definitional distinctions or for revising the law.242  
 This point is supported by a critique of the IDEA written nearly fifteen years 
before Ryan’s article appeared. In Jumping the Queue, Mark Kelman and 
Gillian Lester advance an argument similar to Ryan’s: the scope of the IDEA’s 
protections are arbitrary and unjustified.243 Their reasoning relies only periph-
erally on empirical evidence, and then almost entirely on behavioral studies. The 
main justifications for their position are normative and pragmatic.244 According 
to Kelman and Lester, children the IDEA defines as “learning disabled” should 
not be singled out for special benefits, entitlements, and protections.245 Rather, 
a wide variety of pupils, including the “socioeconomically disadvantaged” and 
“poor achievers” generally, should receive extra help, protection, and re-
sources.246 Kelman and Lester attack the existing statutory categories mainly on 
                                                                                                                               
 240. Id. at 1497.  
 241. See, e.g., KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 6, at 156–60.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. at 160  
 244. See id. at 156–57.  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 156. 
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grounds of justice.247 Based on “competing principles” of redistribution that 
“demand that we compensate for environmental or both environmental and ge-
netic disadvantages,”248 the authors deny that learning disability (LD) students 
are more deserving of special help and protection than students with other types 
of learning impairments, including those traceable to poverty or social depriva-
tion.249 In none of these cases are the students at fault or causally responsible for 
their difficulties. Rather, they are all victims of bad luck (either from an unfor-
tunate biological endowment or from being born into poverty and disadvantage). 
Thus, society is obligated to treat them equally by offering them aid and holding 
them harmless to the extent feasible. Additionally, Kelman and Lester question 
the evidence that classic learning disabled, or LD, students benefit more from 
special help than other “slow learners” and “poor readers” without such a diag-
nosis.250 On consequentialist or efficiency grounds, they contend, there is also 
no basis for any distinction among these categories of children. 
 Like Ryan, Kelman and Lester conclude that the definition of “learning dis-
abled” within the IDEA is both arbitrary and too narrow. But their route to this 
conclusion is very different from Ryan’s. Ryan argues that findings of neurosci-
ence dictate a revision of the category of students the law protects. In contrast, 
Kelman and Lester formulate an argument from principles of fairness and de-
sert, relying on luck egalitarian ideals that recognize society’s obligation to aid 
                                                                                                                               
 247. Kelman and Lester, like Ryan, argue that the categorical distinction between children 
with a “bona-fide” learning disability and underachievement from other causes rests on shaky sci-
entific grounds. But the science they rely on is not the new neuroscience of disadvantage, which 
postdates the publication of their book. Rather, they question the behavioral diagnostic techniques 
long used to label children as having LDs on the traditional “deficit” model, finding “rampant” 
misclassification and “considerable similarities” in patterns displayed by students across a broad 
spectrum of learning difficulties. Id. at 29. 
 248. Id. at 156.  
 249. See id. at 195–96. The authors also speculate that favoring learning disabled (LD) chil-
dren with a “performance-potential gap” fits in with a “left multicultural” identity politics consistent 
with an antidiscrimination model that views these pupils as in greater danger of suffering “discrim-
ination” than children who are garden-variety poor learners, or merely “slow” for a range of “ordi-
nary” reasons, including cultural deprivation or poverty. That is, “[p]upils with [these] learning 
disabilities alone are entitled because they alone have been constructed as a politically plausible 
oppressed group, a subclass . . . of a larger oppressed group, people with disabilities,” who are 
known to be subject to “aversive prejudice and stereotyping.” Id. at 197. Children who are merely 
poor or culturally deprived, in contrast, are not regarded as belonging to a distinct group of social 
victims, subject to special forms of mistreatment and thus entitled to a higher degree of solicitude. 
 250. See id. at 219; see also id. at 33–34, 138. Ryan, for his part, does not completely ignore 
the question of interventional efficacy. Ryan, supra note 124, at 1467. He points out that, in 2004, 
the IDEA was modified to allocate money to struggling students based solely on their projected 
“response-to-intervention (RTI),” or potential for improvement, regardless of the source of their 
learning difficulties. Id. As Ryan notes, the RTI approach sidesteps the strict disability definition 
and encourages schools “to extend extra assistance to all struggling students”—including poor stu-
dents. Id. at 1476. Ryan further observes that whether interventions improve learning does not map 
onto the traditional learning disability or LD discrepancy category—“a failure to respond to inter-
ventions has not been confirmed as a reliable method of identifying students with learning disabili-
ties.” Id.  
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people who are disadvantaged through no choice or fault of their own.251 A va-
riety of children have reading and learning difficulties that hold them back in 
school, compromise their academic achievement, and impede their life pro-
spects. Slow learners are slow learners. Because these shortcomings are not their 
fault, why does it matter how they got that way? Moral and normative consid-
erations, and not any information revealed by neuroscience, render the IDEA’s 
entitlements unjust and incoherent.252  
 Kelman and Lester’s book underscores that Ryan’s reliance on deprivation 
neuroscience to attack the IDEA is misguided. To be sure, all the authors accept 
basic understandings that are grounded in the bedrock facts of biological mate-
rialism. Their arguments assume a fundamental relationship between the brain 
and behavior, and between mental states and physical states. People are organic, 
biological beings, and all behavior has a biological foundation. It follows that 
every distinct behavior corresponds to a distinct brain state and there can be no 
change in behavior without a change in the brain. Difficulties with learning, 
whatever their source or profile, can be traced to functional or anatomical fea-
tures that are not present in the brains of those lacking such difficulties.  
 In addition, these authors’ arguments are consistent with the fundamental 
tenets and causal predicates of behavioral genetics. Brain states and human be-
havior are the product of a range of internal and external forces, including ge-
netic or “innate” predispositions, environmental factors, and some interactive 
mixture of the two. These are categorical understandings that predate, and do 
not depend on, any particular body of neuroscientific research or any specific 
findings at all. They have been repeatedly validated by our understanding of the 
biological nature of organisms, and require no specific observation about par-
ticular brains. Scans and measurements do not deepen our understanding of 
these fundamental truths. Neuroscience only fills in the details. None of these 
details matter to the justice of the IDEA, nor to the question of who should re-
ceive its benefits. 
                                                                                                                               
 251. For a recent exposition of the luck egalitarian approach to societal compensation and 
redistribution see Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck and Responsibility, 7 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 57 (2008). 
See also Justice and Bad Luck, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
justice-bad-luck/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2014). 
 252. See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 6, at 218–26; 194–226. Kelman and Lester, although 
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a significant expansion in the IDEA entitlement scheme. For example, if parental behavior, for 
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that, whatever the provenance of their learning difficulties, children are essentially blameless and 
equal in their deservingness. Even conceding that is the case, however, moral hazard for social ac-
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cumstances. Id. at 192. On the potential for abuse from classifying children as suffering from mental 
disabilities, see, e.g., Patricia Wen, Case Spotlights Disability System, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 17, 2010), 
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V. THE POLICY PAYOFF  
FROM DEPRIVATION NEUROSCIENCE 
 Deprivation and disadvantage, and their effects on human behavior, are so-
cial problems of vexing urgency with no obvious, easy solutions. Neuroscience 
has little or nothing to contribute to addressing these problems and is unlikely 
to add anything of significance in the future. Specifically, developmental neu-
roscience yields no distinct information on how to design interventions, pro-
grams, and policies to alleviate social and economic adversity and its effects, 
over and above contributions from cognate fields and disciplines that are fo-
cused on behavioral measures and outcomes. These include behavioral neuro-
science, cognitive psychology, child development, sociology, behavioral 
psychology, developmental economics, and demography.  
 The payoff from neuroscience is seriously circumscribed by a signal short-
coming that it shares with behavioral and social science: the limited ability to 
distinguish the effects of external influences from “selection”—that is innate or 
genetic factors that are associated with, and causally productive of, the behav-
iors associated with deprivation. And to the extent that “brain science” has any 
relevance to legal and policy questions, its contribution is simply to reaffirm the 
generic axiom of scientific materialism that long predates any specific findings 
in the field.  
 As already discussed, many commentators rely on neuroscience for the 
proposition that childhood SES exerts a significant influence on brain structure 
and function. But, even if this strong causal statement is correct, it was already 
understood from studies of behavior. At most, recent neuroscience reinforces 
this message and fills in some details. It identifies distinctive patterns of brain 
morphology and activity associated with specific behavioral deficits found more 
commonly among lower SES individuals. But that association offers little help 
in formulating effective proposals to reduce disadvantage and its consequences. 
Designing policies and interventions requires, first, that the goals of such efforts 
be identified. In the case of disadvantage, the objective is either to diminish or 
eliminate the disadvantage itself, or to reverse, or attenuate its effects. Second, 
establishing the efficacy of any interventions depends on an arduous process of 
evaluating outcomes. On the simplest level, and assuming causation, prevention 
obviously works. If no one were poor, the developmental impairments that pov-
erty produces would be avoided. Eliminating a cause—assuming it is a cause—
eliminates its effects.  
 But preventing or eliminating disadvantage, in all its aspects, is devilishly 
difficult. The project founders on formidable practical impediments as well as a 
host of unknowns. The term poverty draws our attention to a lack of material 
resources. But too little money may not be responsible for the deficits associated 
with poverty, and providing what money can buy will not necessarily bring im-
provements.253 Can neuroscience help sort out whether lack of money, or some-
thing else correlated with it, stands at the head of the chain of adverse influences 
on the developing brain? At best, neuroscience is an intermediate step, and a 
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strictly optional one, towards illuminating the question of whether the particular 
behavioral traits associated with poverty—including problems with memory, 
learning, self-control, impulsivity, or verbal ability—are the product of inade-
quate parenting, family environment, material deprivation, stressful neighbor-
hoods, cultural practices, direct genetic transmission, or some combination of 
these.  
 Because behavioral patterns, including inputs and outputs, are mandatory 
components of any fruitful investigation of poverty and its consequences, all 
neuroscience must establish its claims by linking up physical findings with be-
havior. The study of behavioral patterns is thus an essential component of any 
meaningful research that identifies brain states and neurofunctional mechanisms 
associated with producing or alleviating deprivation. Likewise, in figuring out 
what works to address the effects of deprivation, it is behavior, and not brain 
states, that must be the focus of the inquiry. Behavioral outcomes are the ulti-
mate test of whether a set of external interventions will prevent, attenuate, or 
cure the detrimental effects of deprivation. Neuroscience can do no better than 
the behavioral evidence itself. It thus adds nothing to policy design, over and 
above what behavioral science can yield.  
 It follows that good behavioral measures are essential to devising effective 
policies. And predictions about any policy’s effectiveness are only as reliable as 
the behavioral evidence on which those predictions rely. Moreover, because 
neuroscience data on poverty’s effects must always be correlated with behav-
ioral observations, showing that associated brain states are altered or improved 
by specific interventions is a purely optional step. Certainly, knowledge of 
mechanisms and morphology cannot teach us how to address poverty and its 
consequences. Rather, behavioral observations are essential, and indispensable, 
to the discovery of pragmatic payoffs. Only behavioral studies can establish the 
association between disadvantage and effective methods for alleviating its det-
rimental effects. The information generated by neuroanatomical or functional 
imaging is neither necessary nor sufficient for crafting effective interventions.  
 Might neuroscience nonetheless offer the promise of a streamlined meth-
odology? Can it get us closer to the answers we need, and do so faster? It has 
been suggested that, if neuroscience could eventually establish an airtight con-
nection between brain states and designated behavioral effects, neuromorpho-
logical or physiological markers might then serve as proxies that can supplant 
or stand in for behavioral measures.254 That suggestion is dubious. Such a sub-
stitution is not only superfluous, but also burdensome and impractical. Scanning 
a brain or measuring brain activity is almost always harder and more intrusive 
than directly documenting the behavioral changes that are the ultimate target of 
any policy intervention and the final gauge of its effectiveness.255 And the link 
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between the proxy and the behavior is difficult and cumbersome to establish.256 
The complexity of behavior and its circumstances suggests that myriad trials, in 
a range of situations, would be necessary to connect neural markers to behavior, 
and would always leave open the possibility of unanticipated circumstances and 
imperfect prediction.257 In sum, evaluating interventions by looking at brain 
states is unlikely to yield simpler and more reliable information than is available 
through behavioral avenues of empirical investigation and analysis.  
 The conclusion that brain science offers no independent programmatic 
payoff is further demonstrated by the paucity of novel or unprecedented recom-
mendations to be found in the neuroscience literature and the commentary that 
draws out its implications. As discussed above, commentators repeatedly high-
light the Perry preschool, Abecedarian, and Chicago parent-child projects, ini-
tiated in the 1960s and 1970s that offered intensive services to poor children and 
their families, with modest long-term results. The other suggested measures 
comprise a familiar litany of projects that have been touted by progressive spe-
cialists for decades. At best, neuroscience supports (although does not defini-
tively establish) developmental experts’ longstanding position that help for poor 
children should come earlier rather than later. Unfortunately, the rate limiting 
step in implementing that insight is not a lack of scientific knowledge. The ini-
tial success of the few most promising early childhood programs has never been 
replicated on a large scale, and other initiatives have had at most limited value. 
The obstacles are behavioral, pragmatic, ethical, cultural, material, and political. 
Knowing more about the brain will not help address or remove them. 
 The policy payoff of neuroscience is further undercut by the failure, and 
indeed the inability, of the research to disentangle the role of environmental and 
innate factors in generating the detriments of disadvantage. As already dis-
cussed, reducing poverty is most likely to make a difference if the experience of 
poverty, as opposed to innate characteristics, is the main or sole engine of the ill 
effects associated with low SES. Although traits with a significant genetic com-
ponent are not necessarily fixed and impervious to interventional improvements, 
they might be. In any event, because the nature of gene/environmental interac-
tion is as yet poorly understood, the payoff from any proposal must be assessed 
on a case by case basis. But this constraint, even when acknowledged, is often 
minimized by scientists working in the neurodeprivation field and scholars com-
menting on their work. Implicitly or by implication, environmental factors are 
assumed to dominate, especially when it comes to neuroscience’s potential to 
point to effective solutions.  
 Is science close to sorting out the importance of genes and environment in 
accounting for the patterns associated with lower SES? The answer is no, and 
further research faces practical and ethical impediments. As noted, prospective 
randomized trials, with well-defined treatment and control groups, provide the 
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most promising avenue for disentangling causal mechanisms and identifying ef-
fective interventions. But the practical ambit of such trials is limited. At the end 
of the day, there is no substitute for seeing what works. What matters is whether 
specific forms of assistance improve target behavior. Visualizing or measuring 
something about the brain is not an essential component of the inquiry. Brain 
science, although intrinsically interesting, is inessential clutter. 
 
 
 
 Neuroscientific studies are worth doing, as they add to our general 
knowledge of the brain. But they do not help us with the social problems of 
deprivation, poverty, and disadvantage. Neuroscience yields no independent 
policy payoff in these areas, and scholars, scientists, and journalists should stop 
claiming otherwise. Because causation is so difficult to disentangle, the effects 
of particular interventions on children growing up in deprived circumstances 
cannot be predicted through any neuroscientific investigations, but only by prac-
tical ones, deploying the methods of behavioral and social science. Designing 
policies depends on real-world constraints and behaviors, and the feasibility—
ethical, practical, and political—of their manipulation. Neuroscience offers no 
help with this project.  
